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PROSECUTION REVIEW COMMISSIONS, THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST, AND THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: THE NEED 
FOR A “GROWN UP” IN THE ROOM 
Carl F. Goodman† 
  Abstract: The recent amendments to Japan’s Inquest of Prosecution Law 
(popularly called the Prosecution Review Commission (“PRC”) Law) give the eleven lay 
member PRC (and their court appointed lawyers) unreviewable authority to compel the 
prosecutions and appeals of defendants who the professional prosecutor service has 
determined do not require indictment and prosecution.  Viewed as “democratic” because 
it brings lay participation to the criminal justice system, the PRC process differs sharply 
from the American Federal Grand Jury because it places ordinary citizens at risk of 
potential retribution and the political system at risk of possible “gaming” of the process 
for political advantage, much as was the case with the Special Prosecutor’s Law in the 
United States.  To date, PRCs have compelled prosecution of five defendants (of whom 
two have been found not guilty), one indictment has been dismissed, one defendant is 
being tried for professional negligence after the professionals on whose advice he relied 
were found not guilty (in a prosecution by professional prosecutors), and one is on trial 
despite a serious statute of limitations question.  The indictment of a powerful political 
figure (found not guilty but the court appointed prosecutors have appealed) had serious 
political repercussions in Japan and caused political turmoil in the first non-Liberal 
Democratic Party majority elected party and government in the Post War era.  
  This article reviews the PRC experience in comparison to the U.S. experience 
with the Special Prosecutor Law and the prosecutions mandated by the PRC to date.  Five 
changes to the PRC process are suggested that, while allowing citizen participation in the 
indictment and prosecution process, would preserve the rights of those accused and 
protect the national interest.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Japan’s 
criminal procedure underwent significant changes.  Reacting to the Law 
Reform Council’s1 recommendation that criminal procedure should embody 
lay participation, Japan instituted a new Saiban’in system under which a 
mixed panel of laymen and professionals would hear certain major crime 
cases.2  In addition, victims’ rights advocates were rewarded for their efforts 
through two changes.3   The first allowed victims of specified crimes to 
appear personally or through counsel at the trial with the right to present 
witnesses and evidence, to cross examine witnesses, and to address the court.  
The second modified the Inquest (more popularly known as the Prosecution 
Review Commission or “PRC”) procedure, so that the group of eleven lay 
persons constituting the PRC panel could, in addition to simply investigating 
and reviewing a prosecutor’s determination not to indict, compel indictment 
of suspects whom the public prosecutor service had previously determined 
                                                      
1 JUSTICE REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL – FOR 
A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY, June 12, 2001, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html.  The Justice System Reform Council was 
established under the Cabinet in July 1999, for the purposes of "clarifying the role to be played by justice in 
Japanese society in the 21st century and examining and deliberating fundamental measures necessary for 
the realization of a justice system that is easy for the people to utilize, participation by the people in the 
justice system, achievement of a legal profession as it should be and strengthening the functions thereof, 
and other reforms of the justice system, as well as improvements in the infrastructure of that system.”  Id. 
(quoting Art. 2, ¶ 1, Law Concerning Establishment of the Justice System Reform Council). 
2 The Saiban’in Panel system replaces the all judge trials at the District Court level and substitutes a 
panel of nine judges (six lay and three professional judges) to determine guilt or innocence, and if guilty the 
appropriate sentence.  The Japan Federation of Bar Associations, to which all Japanese lawyers belong, had 
wanted an American-style jury system, but such dramatic reform was opposed by the judiciary and a 
“compromise” was adopted that appears modeled on the German (and certain other civil law) system’s use 
of mixed panels.  Mixed panels in a case where guilt is contested consist of six lay judges chosen by lot 
from among Japanese voters and three professional judges.  A verdict of the mixed panel requires a 
majority vote with at least one professional judge voting for the majority position.  Appeal from a verdict of 
a mixed panel is permitted as are appeals in all first level Japanese criminal cases.  The appeal is to a High 
Court, but the High Court is supposed to give some deference to the determination of the mixed panel.  
Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 13, 2012, 2011 (A) No. 757, 2:66 SAIKO SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHU 
[KEISHU], http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2012.02.13-2011.-A-.No..757.html.  The system 
has been held to be constitutional.  Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 16, 2010, 2010 (A) No. 1196, 8:65 
SAIKO SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHU [KEISHU], http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2011.11.16-
2010.-A-.No..1196.html; see Lay Judge System OK: Top Court, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 18, 2011, available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20111118a6.html; Saiko Saibansho, [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 13, 2012, 2010 (A) 
No. 1299, 1:66 SAIKO SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHU [KEISHU], http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/t
ext/2012.01.13-2010.-A-.No..1299.html.  
3 Although Japan has a very safe society, some Japanese have lost confidence in their police and for 
years Japan has been considered on the low end of countries providing victim support.  See, e.g., JOHN VAN 
KESTEREN, PAT MAYHEW, AND PAUL NIEUWBEERTA, CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION IN SEVENTEEN 
INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES: KEY FINDINGS FROM THE 2000 INTERNATIONAL CRIME VICTIMS SURVEY, 16 
(The Hague, Ministry of Justice, WODC 2000), available at http://www.unicri.it/documentation_centre/pu
blications/icvs/_pdf_files/key2000i/index.htm#download full text in pdf.  
JANUARY 2013 PRC, PUBLIC INTEREST, AND RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 
 
3
not to indict.  The PRC and Saiban’in both utilize lay participants—the PRC 
at the indictment stage and the Saiban’in at the trial stage.4  These lay 
participation devices brought forth a number of learned articles discussing 
the procedures and their role in Japan’s criminal process.5 
In his illuminating and provocative article People’s Panels vs. 
Imperial Hegemony: Japan’s Twin Lay Justice Systems and the Future of 
American Military Bases in Japan,6 Professor Hiroshi Fukurai examined the 
effect and potential effect of Japan’s recent foray into lay participation in the 
criminal justice arena on Okinawa and its residents.  Professor Fukurai 
concludes, in part: 
[T]he investigative function of the PRC can provide another 
effective strategy to take away the Japanese government’s 
control over the indictment process and insert people’s common 
sense judgments, shared sentiments, and varied life experience 
into the critical examination of military crimes in Okinawa.  
Thus, the twin systems of lay adjudication can potentially serve 
as very powerful vehicles to alter people’s consciousness and 
conception about lay participation in the justice system, and 
create new strategies to establish popular sovereignty and social 
independence in the islands of Okinawa.  They also have the 
potential to alter the nature of the political and legal relationship 
between Okinawa and the “occupying forces” of both Japanese 
and American governments. 
Professor Fukurai concludes that the PRC process of lay participation can 
alter the consciousness of the public and can be used as a vehicle to alter the 
relationship between Okinawa Prefecture, on the one hand, and the 
governments of the United States and Japan, on the other.   
While Professor Fukurai’s article looked at the PRC through a narrow 
lens focused on Okinawa’s special and troubled relationship with 
“mainland” Japan and Okinawa’s role as the “host” to most of the American 
                                                      
4 A Constitutional challenge to the Saiban’in system based on the argument that a criminal 
defendant has a right to be tried by Judges and lay personnel was turned back by the Supreme Court of 
Japan.  See Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 16, 2010, 2010 (A) No. 1196, 8:65 SAIKO SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHU [KEISHU], http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2011.11.16-2010.-A-.No..1196.html; 
Lay Judge System OK: Top Court, supra note 2. 
5 See, e.g., Ingram Weber, The New Japanese Jury System: Empowering the Public, Preserving 
Continental Justice, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 125, 162 (2009); Matthew Wilson, The Dawn of Criminal Jury 
Trials in Japan: Success on the Horizon?, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 835, 850 (2007); Colin Jones, Prospects for 
Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in Japan, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 363, 365–66 (2006) 
(reviewing TAKASHI MURATA, SAIBAN’IN SEIDO [THE LAY JUDGE SYSTEM] (Heibonsha 2004)). 
6 Hiroshi Fukurai, People’s Panels vs. Imperial Hegemony: Japan’s Twin Lay Justice Systems and 
the Future of American Military Bases in Japan, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 95 (2010). 
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military, this article looks at the PRC through a wider angle lens that 
encompasses Japan in general.  Indictments brought about as a consequence 
of the “reformed” PRC proceedings have not been against American military 
personnel but rather have involved Japanese nationals (and in one case a 
Chinese ship captain indicted in absentia) and high profile events or figures.7  
Examined in this light, the PRC—as presently structured—has the 
potential to damage the personal reputations of Japanese and other nationals, 
undermine Japan’s relations with foreign countries, and harm Japanese 
democracy.  These effects flow from the “reformed” PRC law taking away 
the “Japanese government’s control over the indictment process” and 
replacing it with the unbridled discretion of lay persons whose focus may be 
unduly skewed by the notoriety of the event or potential accused.   
Members of the PRC lack the authority to consider the bigger picture 
because they have been mandated to perform a narrow role that looks solely 
at the event, rather than how indictment can affect the standing of the 
potential accused or Japan’s bigger interests.  Emotion, a shared sense that 
someone must pay, and a potential to embarrass the government may subject 
individuals accused by the PRC to a loss of reputation, an emotionally 
draining criminal trial experience, and substantial financial harm when there 
is simply not enough evidence to proceed.  So too, the national interest may 
be damaged.  Allowing the common sense and sentiments of the community 
to compel a defendant to stand trial is an entirely different matter from 
allowing the common sense of the community to find an accused guilty of a 
crime.  Thus, as currently structured, the PRC acts as a brake on the public 
prosecutor’s ability to safeguard the unpopular but innocent.   
Further, events transpiring since Professor Fukurai’s article raise 
substantial questions about the wisdom of a system that permits lay 
participants unbridled discretion to require the government to place an 
individual on trial for a crime.  These events suggest that further amendment 
of the Inquest of Prosecution Law is required to remedy defects that have 
already had an adverse effect on individuals and the Japanese public. 
The Saiban’in, or mixed panel system, which employs lay jurors as 
part of the decision making process in certain criminal trials in Japan, is 
clearly a step in the right direction of furthering liberty.  Like the United 
States petite jury, it places lay participants between the accused and the State 
when rendering a verdict that can take life or liberty.  
The current version of the PRC does not diminish the power of State 
actors to take away life or liberty.  That power remains unfettered.  The PRC 
                                                      
7 See infra Parts IV-V. 
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just adds an additional layer so that lay persons may now also begin the 
process of taking away life or liberty.  The new PRC law subjects persons to 
State power rather than protecting persons from State power.  
Because the PRC has sometimes been characterized as Japan’s 
version of the Grand Jury,8 Part II of this paper examines the basic function 
of the PRC, comparing and differentiating that function with the American 
Federal Grand Jury.  This part will not dwell on the history of the PRC or the 
2009 reform, however, as these topics are extensively covered in Professor 
Fukurai’s excellent analysis.9  Part III will then discuss the now disbanded 
Special Prosecutor Law in the U.S.10 to determine whether that experience 
contains any lessons for the Japanese situation.  From there, Part IV will 
discuss recent actions by the PRC and judicial proceedings involving those 
actions.  Because of its significance, however, the trial of the Democractic 
Party of Japan (“DPJ”) founder 11  and former leader Ichiro Ozawa, his 
subsequent acquittal, and the effect of that trial on Japanese democracy will 
be discussed separately in Part V.  Lastly, Part VI will discuss the lessons 
learned from the U.S. and Japanese experiences and Part VII will suggest 
five modest but important changes to the Inquest of Prosecution Law.  The 
solutions suggested are not draconian and would not return the PRC to its 
former docile and impotent pre-amendment state, but would make the PRC 
process more reliable by balancing the interests of the victim, the suspect, 
and the public.  In particular, one suggestion would create an additional 
body—learned in the law, removed from the prosecutor service, and above 
politics, composed of people whose experience assures that the interests of 
the accused, the government, and the public are considered before a PRC-
mandated prosecution goes forward.  Only if this proposed body concludes 
that there was in fact sufficient evidence of guilt to warrant indictment (not 
                                                      
8 Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan’s Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems as Deliberative Agents of Social 
Change: De-Colonial Strategies and Deliberative Participatory Democracy, 86 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 789 
(2011) (“May 21, 2009 signaled the beginning of Japan’s paradigmatic shift in its effort to democratize its 
judicial institutions.  The Japanese government finally introduced two significant judicial institutions, i.e., 
the Quasi-Jury (Saiban-in), and the new Grand Jury (Kensatsu Shinsakai or Prosecutorial Review 
Commission (PRC)) systems.”); Stuart Biggs and Masatsugu Horie, Japan Adopts Grand Juries, Jury Duty 
After Criminal Case Abuse, BLOOMBERG, May 18, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=aMHcMKnWIjBk&refer=japan.   
9 Fukurai, supra note 6. 
10 Ethics in Government Act, Title VI, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99.    
11 The Democratic Party of Japan (“DPJ”) is, at the time of this writing, the majority party in Japan’s 
Lower House, and the ruling party in Japan.  
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conviction), and that indictment is not contrary to the national interest, could 
the PRC mandate an indictment.12 
II. THE PROSECUTION REVIEW COMMISSION VERSUS THE UNITED STATES 
FEDERAL COURT GRAND JURY 
A. The United States Federal Grand Jury 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in 
relevant part, that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger. . .”13 Thus, each 
person against whom the federal government seeks to proceed in a criminal 
trial of a capital or infamous crime is entitled to a Federal Grand Jury 
reviewing the government’s determination that there is enough evidence to 
go forward with a trial.14  This is a procedural right flowing from English 
                                                      
12  In addition to the PRC, Japanese law permits victims of certain crimes to petition the court to 
appoint a prosecutor when the prosecutor service has declined to prosecute.  KEIJI SOSHOHO [KEISOHO][C. 
CRIM. PRO] 1948, art. 262, available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&ft=2
&re=02&dn=1&yo=code+of+criminal+procedure&x=45&y=10&ky=&page=1&vm=02 (“Where a person 
who has filed a complaint or accusation regarding an offense set forth in Articles 193 to 196 of the Penal 
Code, Article 45 of the Subversive Activities Prevention Act (Act No. 240 of 1952), or Article 42 or 43 of 
the Act on Regulation of Organizations Which Have Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder (Act No. 147 
of 1999) is dissatisfied with the disposition not to institute prosecution made by a public prosecutor, the 
complainant or accuser may request the district court which has jurisdiction over the public prosecutor’s 
office to which that public prosecutor belongs to commit the case to a court for trial.”); see also, id. at  art. 
266 (“A court shall render a ruling according to the following classifications when it receives a claim set 
forth in Article 266 [sic–likely means article 261]; . . . (ii) Where the request is well-grounded, the case 
shall be committed to the competent district court for trial.”); Id. at, art. 268 (“Where a case has been 
committed to trial pursuant to the provision of item (ii) of Article 266, the court shall appoint one attorney 
who shall maintain the prosecution of such case from among the attorneys . . . ”).This procedure has been 
infrequently used and rarely have courts appointed such special prosecutors.  See DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE 
JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN, 223 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2002) (“ . . . [the 
prosecution petition] constitutes almost no check at all. . . In the first place, this procedure can be applied to 
only a narrow range of offenses—mostly police brutality and other abuses of official authority.  It is seldom 
used . . . In the aggregate, analogical prosecution stands a short step away from utter irrelevance.”)  This 
procedure is not considered herein.  
13 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
14 The Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury requirement applies only as against the federal government.  
Differing standards apply to indictment by State Prosecutors.  In some States, Grand Jury indictment is 
required for all serious crimes (felonies).  In others it is limited to capital cases, and in some states Grand 
Juries can compel indictment.  The differences between the use of grand juries by differing State law is 
permitted, but one function of grand juries when they are used to cabin prosecutorial action is the fact that 
in such situations they check the power of the prosecutor to charge.  This is the major function of the 
Federal Grand Jury, but this function is not a part of the Prosecution Review Commission’s charter.  The 
power to charge in Japan is a prosecutorial power unfettered by judicial review or lay review such as by a 
Grand Jury.  As discussed below, it is only the prosecutor’s determination to refuse to charge that concerns 
the Prosecution Review Commission. 
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common law that was enshrined when Grand Juries refused to indict 
enemies of the King in pre-colonial days.15  The colonists picked up this 
right and used it as a protection against the Crown.16  It was placed in the 
Constitution to protect persons from unwarranted government prosecution17 
or, as Judge Hawkins has described, as a means of screening the 
government’s desire to prosecute.18  It is designed, as was most of the Bill of 
Rights, to protect the rights of citizens against abuse by the government.  
The Grand Jury serves “as a kind of buffer or referee between the 
Government and the people.”19  This buffer includes both a review of the 
evidence and a review of the discretion used by the prosecutor in seeking an 
indictment.  As has been noted:   
                                                      
15 Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of a U.S. Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy and Its 
Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L.  REV. 1 (1996). 
16 Hon. Michael Daly Hawkins, The Federal Grand Jury: Fish, Fowl, or Fair-Weather Game, 33 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 823, 826-28 (2008): 
The British version of the Grand Jury was an instrument of royal authority, a tax 
collecting and enforcement arm of the Crown that evolved into something very different–
a protective barrier between local colonists and governmental power appointed and 
directed by George III . . .  The concept of a Grand Jury fits comfortably in a 
governmental system in which the people are held to be sovereign.  Its central notion that 
government desire to prosecute must be screened through citizen judgment–is entirely 
consistent with the national mood in which it became part of the Constitution.   
17 See Kadish, supra note 15: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger . . . 
Two celebrated cases became the catalyst for writers to define the rights and powers of 
English grand juries.  When pro-Protestant grand juries in London refused to indict 
Catholic King Charles II's enemies, Lord Shaftesbury and Stephen Colledge, the Grand 
Jury became an institution “capable of being a real safeguard for the liberties of the 
subject.”  For the first time, grand juries were positively identified as something other 
than enforcement agencies of central government; they also existed for the protection of 
the accused. . . As the colonies moved closer to revolution, the Grand Jury took on a third 
role: outright resistance to the monarchy.  Three successive grand juries refused to indict 
John Peter Zenger, whose newspaper criticized the withdrawal of jury trials and the royal 
control of New York.  While the King was withdrawing the right to trial by jury and 
attempting to initiate prosecutions by informations, colonial grand juries responded by 
making “stinging denunciations of Great Britain and stirring defenses of their rights as 
Englishmen.”. . . After the Revolution, the centralized government was created without a 
Federal Grand Jury . . . In 1791, the Fifth Amendment was adopted as part of the Bill of 
Rights, with its Grand Jury Clause insuring that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury . . . The Grand Jury Clause protected the people against arbitrary and overzealous 
government by protecting ‘against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution.” 
18 Hawkins, supra note 16.  This screening or limiting function is the major—but not exclusive—
function of the Federal Grand Jury.  The Grand Jury can investigate into criminal activity and file reports 
upon its dissolution.  18 U.S.C. §§ 3332, 3333 (1970).   
19 United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992).   
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 In theory, an indicting Grand Jury is convened to evaluate the 
sufficiency of the evidence according to a fixed legal standard.  
In practice, its functions are more subtle and complex.  When 
reviewing individual cases, grand juries can pass independent 
judgment upon the discretionary decisions made by the 
prosecutor as well as upon the institutions within the criminal 
justice system.”20   
The Grand Jury is not required to indict even if the prosecution presents 
sufficient evidence to warrant indictment.21   
 Although a “protector of liberty,” there is no constitutional 
requirement that the Grand Jury be presented with evidence contradictory to 
the prosecutor’s view of the case.  Similarly, there is also no requirement 
that the jury be told that it retains the power to refuse to indict despite 
evidence that the accused committed the crime.  These “shortcomings” have 
stirred a sharp debate as to whether the Model Charge goes far enough, 
should be changed, or should require the prosecutor to present exculpatory 
evidence to the Grand Jury. 22   By policy determination, “[t]he U.S. 
Department of Justice's policy is that a prosecutor must disclose to the Grand 
Jury, before seeking an indictment, ‘substantial evidence that directly 
negates the guilt of the subject of the investigation’ when the prosecutor is 
‘personally aware’ of that evidence.”23 
In the words of Professor Fukurai, the Federal Grand Jury, like the 
petite jury, places the common sense of the community between the 
prosecutor and the accused–this sense it “can provide another effective 
strategy to take away the . . . government’s control over the indictment 
process and insert people’s common sense judgments, shared sentiments, 
                                                      
20 Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal 
Justice System, 82 B. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002).   
21 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986).  Moreover, "[t]he Grand Jury is not bound to indict 
in every case where a conviction can be obtained."  United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 
1979)(Friendly, J., dissenting).  Judge Friendly in turn stated, “By refusing to indict, the Grand Jury has the 
unchallengeable power to defend the innocent from government oppression by unjust prosecution.  And it 
has the equally unchallengeable power to shield the guilty, should the whims of the jurors or their 
conscious or subconscious response to community pressures induce twelve or more jurors to give sanctuary 
to the guilty.”  United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1965).  See also, Model Grand Jury 
Charge, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JuryService/ModelGrandJuryCh
arge.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2012, 3:16 PM).   
22 See, e.g., Hawkins, supra note 16. 
23 Judge James F. Holderman & Charles B. Redfern, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the 
Federal System Revisited, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 527, 557 (2008).  The authors explain that “[t]he 
ABA Prosecution Standards go further by prohibiting the prosecutor from knowingly not disclosing 
favorable evidence to the Grand Jury.” Id. (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.6(b)(1993) 
("No prosecutor should knowingly fail to disclose to the Grand Jury evidence which tends to negate guilt or 
mitigate the offense.")). 
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and varied life experience into the critical examination of . . . crimes . . . .”24  
However this is not for the purpose of requiring the suspect be charged, but 
rather for the purpose of protecting the suspect by refusing to charge.  This is 
a fundamental and critical difference between the Grand Jury and the PRC.25  
This distinction is based on the history of the Grand Jury and its role as a 
shield between the citizen and the government.26  Nevertheless, it cannot be 
denied that the Grand Jury has, to a great extent, become a tool of the 
prosecutor, and usually follows the prosecutor’s will. 27   This shield has 
significant holes in it, the greatest perhaps being the right of the prosecutor 
when unsuccessful before one Grand Jury to empanel another to seek (and 
obtain) the same indictment.28   
Although the Federal Grand Jury may refuse to indict in the face of 
evidence of guilt, it lacks the power to force the prosecutor to indict.  The 
Supreme Court has said that “[t]he federal courts have concluded uniformly 
that Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, providing that an 
indictment ‘must be signed by an attorney for the government,’ precludes 
federal grand juries from issuing an indictment without the prosecutor’s 
signature, signifying his or her approval.”29  In this sense, the Grand Jury’s 
                                                      
24  Fukurai, supra note 6. 
25 See infra Part II.C. 
26 United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 634 (2002); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.  375, 390, 82 S. Ct. 
1364 (1962) (noting that, “[h]istorically, this body has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent 
against hasty, malicious, and oppressive persecution [and] stand[s] between the accuser and the accused.”)   
27 See Hawkins, supra note 16.   
28 Williams, 504 U.S at 49 (“The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not bar a 
Grand Jury from returning an indictment when a prior Grand Jury has refused to do so.”).  In addition,  
[T]he decision to indict rests with the Grand Jury.  It may indict in the face of probable 
cause, but it need not; it cannot be required to indict nor punished for failing to do so.  On 
the other hand, the prosecution is free to resubmit a matter for reconsideration by the 
same Grand Jury or by a subsequent panel and a Grand Jury panel is free to reexamine a 
matter notwithstanding the prior results of its own deliberations or those of another panel.  
Moreover, the defendant will not be heard to complain that the panel was not informed of 
their prerogative to decline to indict even if presented with probable cause.   
CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE: THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY (last updated Jan. 22, 
2008) (footnotes omitted), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-1135.pdf.  See also, Roger A. 
Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 744 (2008) 
(suggesting that even though a second Grand Jury can be empanelled and the defendant charged, refusal to 
charge by the first panel “may send a message to the government”). 
29 Rehberg v. Paulk, No. 10-788, slip op. at 14, n. 2 (2012) (citing WAYNE LAFAVE, JEROLD ISRAEL, 
NANCY KING & ORIN KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §15.1(d) (3d ed. 2007)).  The Court also noted that “in 
some jurisdictions, the grand jury may return an indictment and initiate a prosecution without the 
prosecutor’s signature, but such cases are rare.”  Id.  See also, SARA SUN BEALE, WILLIAM BRYSON, 
MICHAEL ELSTON & JAMES FELMAN, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE, 4–76, n. 2 (2d ed., West Group 
2001).  Further, “it is almost always a prosecutor who is responsible for the decision to present a case to a 
grand jury, and in many jurisdictions, even if an indictment is handed up, a prosecution cannot proceed 
unless the prosecutor signs the indictment.”  See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F. 2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied sub nom; Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S.  935 (1965) (“The role of the Grand Jury is restricted to a 
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power to decline to indict is a corollary to the prosecutors’ own discretion to 
refuse to prosecute.  In essence, the Federal Prosecutor and Grand Jury act as 
a check on each other.  The Federal Prosecutor cannot proceed in an 
infamous crime case without the approval of a Grand Jury and the Federal 
Grand Jury cannot charge without the consent of the Federal Prosecutor.30  
However, these corollary powers point in the same direction, towards lack of 
prosecution; they each protect the suspect against criminal proceedings.31 
In sum, the salutary function of the Grand Jury has unfortunately 
become in many instances a relic of the past as many prosecutors have 
commandeered the Grand Jury.  Nonetheless, the process meets the 
important principle to “first do no harm,” as compelling indictment still 
remains with the prosecutor, subject to review by the Federal Grand Jury. 
B. Comparing and Contrasting the PRC with the U.S. Grand Jury 
The PRC was a creation of the American Occupation, which sought to 
introduce the American form of Grand Jury to Japan but settled for the PRC 
                                                                                                                                                              
finding as to whether or not there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed.  The 
discretionary power of the attorney for the United States in determining whether a prosecution shall be 
commenced or maintained may well depend upon matters of policy wholly apart from any question of 
probable cause.”). 
30 In United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F..3d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir.  2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 1036, the en banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that:  
[G]rand juries and prosecutors serve as a check on one another.  The Grand Jury, acting on 
its own information, may return a presentment, may request that the prosecutor prepare an 
indictment, or may review an indictment submitted by the prosecutor.  The prosecutor has no 
obligation to prosecute the presentment, to sign the return of an indictment, or even to 
prosecute an indictment properly returned.   
See also, United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (“[W]hether to prosecute and what charge to file 
or bring before a Grand Jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion.”); 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (assuming probable cause exists, the decision of whether and 
what to charge “rests entirely in [the prosecutor's] discretion”); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 
(1974) (“[The] Executive Branch has exclusive and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a 
case”); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1869) (“Public prosecutions, until 
they come before the court to which they are returnable, are within the exclusive discretion of the district 
attorney”); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d at 182 (Brown, J., concurring); id. at 193 (Wisdom, J., 
concurring) (the Grand Jury also has no obligation to prepare a presentment or to return an indictment 
drafted by the jury).  The prosecutor thus determines not only whether probable cause exists, but also 
whether to “charge a greater offense or a lesser offense; numerous counts or a single count; and perhaps 
most significant of all, a capital offense or a noncapital offense all on the basis of the same facts.”  Vasquez, 
474 U.S. at 263,  And, significantly, the Grand Jury may refuse to return an indictment even “where a 
conviction can be obtained.” Id. (citing Ciambrone, 601 F. 2d at 629) (Friendly, J., dissenting). 
31 As noted, infra Part B, the PRC does not protect the suspect against criminal proceedings—it 
compels such proceedings.  
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because of Japanese objection. 32   It is an entity that exists throughout 
Japan.33  Each Commission is composed of eleven laypersons chosen by lot, 
each of whom serves a six-month term.  Approximately half of each 
commission is selected every three months, and members cannot serve 
consecutive terms.  Each PRC receives complaints from crime victims 
dissatisfied by the career public prosecutors’ decision not to indict.  In 
addition, the PRC may itself investigate a decision not to indict without 
receiving a complaint.  Under the law prior to the 2009 amendment, the 
PRC’s authority was simply to require that the public prosecutor service 
reexamine its decision; the PRC could not compel indictment.  As a general 
rule, the prosecutor service stood by its previous decision and no prosecution 
was initiated.34  
The decision of the public prosecutor service to stand by its initial 
decision is not surprising.  Japanese prosecutors tend not to act on their own, 
but rather they work in teams and offices where information is shared, 
guidance from colleagues is solicited and freely given, and where 
collegiality and consistency are highly regarded.35  Consequently, a decision 
to indict or not to indict is a collegial, collaborative effort.36  Prosecutors are 
not elected and do not have to play to the electorate when a “hot button” 
case reaches the office. 37   Unlike the U.S. prosecutor, the Japanese 
prosecutor does not have the luxury of indicting and then casting the 
decision of guilt or innocence on the jury. 38   The existence of the 
prosecutor’s quasi-judicial function—determining to “suspend 
                                                      
32 ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN 104-106 (Princeton Univ. Press 1976); 
Setsuko Kamiya, Inquest Bodies give Public a Voice, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, http://www.japantimes.
co.jp/text/nn20100921i1.html. 
33  Kenatsu shinsakai hou [Law for the Inquest of Prosecution] Law No. 147 of 1948, amended by 
Keiji soshōhō to no ichibu wo kaisei suru hōritsu [Law to Amend the Criminal Procedure Code and Other 
Laws] Law No. 62 of 2004.  
34 For a discussion of the PRC prior to amendment, see Mark D. West, Prosecution Review 
Commissions: Japan's Answer to the Problem of Prosecutorial Discretion, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 684 (1992); 
See also, Fukurai, supra note 6. 
35 JOHNSON, supra note 12; see also, Motoo Noguchi, Criminal Justice in Asia and Japan and the 
International Criminal Court, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 585, 594 (2006).   
36 JOHNSON, supra note 12. 
37 CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 406-07 (2d ed., 
Kluewer Law Int’l 2008). 
38 Cases that are prosecuted almost invariably lead to conviction.  The conviction rate in 2008  
was approximately 99.8%.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 2009:  ENHANCEMENT OF 
MEASURES TO PREVENT REPEAT OFFENSES , table 2-3-1-1 [hereinafter WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 2009], 
available at http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/en/58/image/image/h002003001001h.jpg (last visited Oct. 26, 
2012); see also, Norimitsu Onishi, Coerced Confessions: Justice Derailed in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,    
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/07/world/asia/07iht-japan.1.5596308.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(reporting a conviction rate of 99.8%).  Thus, the decision of the public prosecutor service is essentially the 
guilty or not guilty verdict in the case.  
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prosecution”—together with the authority of the police to decide not to 
transmit cases to the prosecutor, even if there is enough evidence to proceed, 
is well known in Japan.39  In reality, less than ten percent of all solved 
crimes wind up being prosecuted.40  This follows from the Japanese criminal 
justice system’s primary function—namely, attempting to solve the crime, 
restoring the victim to some sense of pre-crime normality, and rehabilitating 
the offender whenever possible.41  There are, of course, cases where it is felt 
that the defendant must be punished, either to make the victim whole or 
because of the nature of the crime or the criminal.  These cases are typically 
prosecuted.   
Decisions to prosecute are made when the prosecutor:  1) feels certain 
of victory—this reflects the reality that the prosecutor will be successful at 
trial in over 99% of the cases tried and that defendants will have confessed 
in the vast majority of cases, 42  and 2) has exercised his quasi-judicial 
authority and decided indictment is appropriate.  Because there is no formal 
plea bargaining in Japan, even where the defendant does not recant a 
confession, there must still be a trial before the defendant can be found 
guilty.43  Whether the Japanese courts defer to prosecutors because they are 
aware of the high percentage of cases that are not brought to trial, the 
collegial decision making process in the public prosecutors’ office washes 
out all but the “sure things,” or for some other reason(s); the reality is that 
prosecutors rarely lose at the trial court level, and if they do lose, they 
                                                      
39 For detailed statistics on suspension of prosecution, see JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY 
WITHOUT POWER 127, table 6-3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991); Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism 
of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 317, 350 (1992); Masaki Koyama, Prosecuting – Japanese 
Style, NEW L. J. 1267, 1268 (1991); Nobuyoshi Araki, The Flow of Criminal Cases in the Japanese 
Criminal Justice System, 31 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, 601, 617, table 2 (1985); West, supra note 34, at 
684.  For more recent statistics, see MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 2008: THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND ATTRIBUTES OF ELDERLY OFFENDERS AND THEIR TREATMENT,  table 2-2-3-3,  
available at  http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/en/57/image/image/h002002003003h.jpg. (last visited Oct. 26, 
2012).  
40  WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 2009, pt. 2, ch. 2, sec. 3, 
available at http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/en/58/nfm/n_58_2_2_2_3_0.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
41 GOODMAN, supra note 37 at 385, 387-388; John O. Haley, Comment on Using Criminal 
Punishment to Serve Both Victim and Social Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (2009), 
available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1528&context=lcp&seiredir=1&re
ferer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Djohn%2520o.%2520
haley%252C%2520comment%2520on%2520using%2520criminal%2520punishment%2520to%2520serve
%2520both%2520victim%2520and%2520social%2520needs%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D1%26ved%3
D0CCEQFjAA%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fscholarship.law.duke.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewconte
nt.cgi%253Farticle%253D1528%2526context%253Dlcp%26ei%3D0qLUOLcAoWvigKL0YDIBg%26usg
%3DAFQjCNEhWYfZ9b5f_nQbxbnC7YGvj7HohQ#search=%22john%20o.%20haley%2C%20comment
%20using%20criminal%20punishment%20serve%20both%20victim%20social%20needs%22 
42 Daniel H. Foote, Confessions and the Right to Silence in Japan, 21 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415 
(1991). 
43 GOODMAN, supra note 37  at 396. 
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frequently win at the appeal level in those few cases lost at the trial court and 
appealed.44   
Thus, there is a kind of circular process at work–the decision not to 
prosecute leads to a high conviction rate, while the high conviction rate 
means the prosecutor service must be careful to only prosecute when there is 
a very high certainty of guilt.  These are of course generalities, and the need 
felt on the part of police and prosecutors to solve high profile cases does 
sometimes lead to indictment, trial, and conviction when the defendant is not 
guilty.45  This same need will sometimes lead to police and/or prosecutor 
misconduct—especially in the process of obtaining the confession from a 
suspect.46  Similarly, because counsel are not allowed to be present when 
prosecutors and/or police question a suspect and interrogation sessions are 
not recorded in their entirety,47  the potential for abuse is high.  Recent 
scandals involving prosecutorial misconduct, including doctoring evidence 
by one of Japan’s “flying squads” (special investigative units in the 
prosecutors’ office), 48  comments from members of Saiban’in panels 
suggesting that citizen jurors would be better served if the entirety of the 
interrogation were recorded, and Japan’s growing problem with false 
confession convictions that have been reversed 49  have led to some 
movement toward recording interrogation sessions in their entirety.  It has 
been suggested that eventually such full recording will become 
commonplace in Japan.50   
Judicial deference to prosecutors after indictment means that many 
defendants do not have the guarantee of neutral judicial review over whether 
the prosecutor’s determination of the defendant’s guilt is valid.  Recent 
events such as the refusal of a Saiban’in panel to convict a defendant of 
murder where the defendant’s fingerprints were at the scene of the crime, but 
                                                      
44 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 2007: THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND ATTRIBUTES OF 
REPEAT OFFENDERS AND COUNTERMEASURES TO RECIDIVISM 69 [hereinafter WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 
2007].   
45 See, e.g., Onishi, supra note 38.  
46 See, e.g., Ex-senior officer charged over 'fumiji' interrogation ploy, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20071123a3.html. 
47 See Japanese Justice: Confess and Be Done With It, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8 2007, 
http://www.economist.com/node/8680941.   
48 See Prosecutor Jailed Over Tampering, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 12, 2011, http://newsonjapan.com/html/
newsdesk/article/88913.php; Prosecutor Who Cheated Gets 1 ½ Years, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 13. 2011,  
available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110413a2.html.   
49   Fukawa Incident Case Acquittal May Stir Reforms, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 15, 2011, http://search.japa
ntimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110315f1.html; Court Acquits Pair After Serving Decades in Jail,  
JAPAN TIMES, May 25, 2011, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110525a2.html. 
50 David T. Johnson, You Don’t Need a Weather Man to Know Which Way the Wind Blows: Lessons 
From the United States and South Korea for Recording Interrogations in Japan, 24 RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 
13 (2007). 
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not on the murder weapon or in places where a robber would likely have left 
them, may herald less deference for prosecutorial determinations.51  So, too, 
a sharply divided 2010 decision of the Supreme Court of Japan overturning a 
conviction and remanding for further trial in a case of circumstantial 
evidence52 may reflect a changing judicial attitude.  It is too early to tell. 
In 2009, the PRC was given additional powers. 53   Now, after a 
supermajority of eight out of the eleven PRC members determines that a 
prosecutor should have prosecuted the case, the PRC decision is sent to the 
prosecutor’s office, and the prosecutor is required to reexamine its decision.  
If the public prosecutor, after review. determines to prosecute, then 
indictment will follow, and the PRC will be so advised.  If the prosecutor 
remains firm in not prosecuting, it must advise the PRC why it has refused to 
act favorably on the PRC’s first determination.  The PRC then reconvenes to 
consider the matter.  Upon reconvening, the PRC may call witnesses, review 
facts, and receive legal advice from private attorneys.  If the PRC decides 
(by the same supermajority of eight) a second time that the case should be 
prosecuted then it will report this fact to the court.  Thereupon the court must 
appoint a bengoshi (a practicing lawyer or team of lawyers) to prosecute the 
case in place of the public prosecutor service.  This team of “specially 
appointed” prosecutors will be recommended to the court by the Japan 
Federation of Bar Associations.  As a practical matter, the court will appoint 
the team selected by the Bar, and the Bar will only select bengoshi who have 
agreed to serve as “specially appointed” prosecutors.  The “specially 
appointed” prosecutor will then obtain the defendant’s indictment and bring 
the case to trial (and if the defendant is acquitted will determine whether to 
appeal).  Challenge to the indictment based on asserted errors or defects in 
the PRC’s handling of the matter cannot be raised as a preliminary matter 
but is considered along with guilt or innocence as part of the trial of the 
criminal charge.  
It is not always clear who is the victim of a crime, and thus in a 
position to seek a review by the PRC.  For example, if a woman is raped, we 
easily can identify the victim and she can file a claim with the PRC, as can 
the family of a murder victim.  But if a politician is alleged to have received 
a bribe, or to have filed or participated in the filing of a false financial report, 
                                                      
51 Kagoshima, Gallows Averted in a First as Llay Judges Acquit, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20101211a1.html.  
52 Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 2010, 2007 (A) No. 80, 64 SAIKO SAIBANCHO KEIJI 
HANREISHU [KEISHU] 3, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2010.04.27-2007.-A-.No..80.html 
(guilty verdict based on circumstantial evidence only permitted where 
fact proving guilt cannot be reasonably explained except for guilt).   
53 For a more complete discussion of the 2009 amendments, see Fukurai, supra note 6. 
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the number of victims can be enormous.  If the losing candidate or 
supporters of the losing candidates qualify as victims, any politician could 
be subject to several proceedings before the PRC.  It is possible that such 
proceedings may take place simultaneously before different PRCs in 
different parts of Japan or at least in different parts of the candidate’s 
electoral district.  In fact, in the Ichiro Ozawa case discussed below there 
were separate PRCs in different parts of Tokyo that considered aspects of the 
charges—although one PRC stepped aside once the other had determined 
that prosecution should have been brought.54   
As noted earlier, some have compared the PRC to the Grand Jury. 
However, unlike the U.S. Grand Jury, the PRC does not review 
determinations of the prosecutor to not prosecute.  Indictment is an internal 
decision of the prosecutor service with no “buffer or referee between the 
Government and the people.”  The PRC’s review is limited solely to the 
decision not to prosecute.55  
Unlike the Japanese public prosecutor, the PRC need not consider 
(indeed does not know) precedent in the prosecutor office for handling of 
similar cases.  Likewise, it has no need to consider the gravity of prosecution 
on either the target of its investigation or the public interest.  The PRC is not 
a protector of the liberties of the target of the investigation as is (or at least 
could be) the Grand Jury.  Rather, it is a protector of the crime victim’s right 
to have the alleged perpetrator indicted, even if the evidence against the 
suspect is weak, or prosecution is against the national interest.  To equate the 
PRC with the Grand Jury is to turn the function of the Grand Jury on its 
head.   
III. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LAW 
On May 25, 1973, former Solicitor General during the Kennedy 
Administration, Archibald Cox, was appointed by Attorney General Elliot 
Richardson to be the Justice Department’s Special Prosecutor to look into 
the events surrounding the break-in at the Democratic National Committee 
Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in Washington, D.C.  Cox was given 
broad authority and discretion by the Attorney General but was a 
Department of Justice employee and had no “independent” status.56  Cox 
                                                      
54  See notes and text infra. 
55  For a discussion of the function of the PRC after the 2009 amendments, see Fukurai, supra note 6. 
56 For a history of the Watergate matter and the role of the Special Prosecutor, see The Nixon 
Administration and Watergate: Watergate Special Prosecutor, HISTORY COMMONS, http://www.historyco
mmons.org/timeline.jsp? (last visited Oct. 27, 2012) [hereinafter History Commons on Watergate]; The 
Watergate Story, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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discovered that President Nixon had a secret recording system in the White 
House that might have recorded conversations by high level officials 
amounting to a cover up of the Watergate matter.  Cox, using the Grand Jury 
as an investigative tool, obtained a subpoena57 for the White House tapes.58  
In response, the President invoked Executive Privilege.  Cox would not be 
deterred, and the President ordered the Attorney General to fire Cox. 59  
Richardson resigned and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus 
similarly refused and resigned.60  Solicitor General Bork then became Acting 
Attorney General and fired Cox. 61  The resignations of Richardson and 
Ruckelshaus, occurring on Saturday night, became known as the Saturday 
Night Massacre. 62   The firing and resignations created a public uproar 
leading to the appointment of Leon Jaworski as the new Watergate Special 
Prosecutor.  Because of the events surrounding the firing of Cox and the 
public uproar, his independence was assured.63  Jaworski subpoenaed sixty-
four White House Tapes, and—when the White House refused to produce 
them—instituted litigation to obtain them.64  In United States v.  Nixon, the 
Supreme Court of the United States enforced the subpoena and ordered that 
the tapes be produced. 65   Eventually, Congress considered Articles of 
Impeachment against the President.  Rather than face impeachment, 
President Nixon resigned and Vice President Ford became President.66 
After President Ford lost his bid for election as President to Jimmy 
Carter, the Carter Administration and Congress enacted a Special Prosecutor 
Law (the “Act”) as part of the Ethics in Government Act (1978) that created 
                                                                                                                                                              
srv/politics/special/watergate/part1.htm (last visited, Oct. 27, 2012) [hereinafter The Washington Post on 
Watergate]. 
57 See Jim Mokhiber, A Brief History of the Independent Counsel Law, PUBLIC BROADCASTING 
SERVICE, May 1998, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/counsel/office/history.html.   
58  A Congressional Committee also sought the tapes and compromised with the White House by 
agreeing to accept White House summaries of the tapes.  Cox, however, refused and insisted on getting the 
tapes himself.  Id.  
59 Id.   
60 Id. 
61 Id.  Bork has been criticized in some circles for his act.  However, it can be argued that the point 
had been made by the Richardson and Ruckelshaus resignations, and that the country needed an Attorney 
General.   
62 Id. 
63 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, n.8-9 (1974) (concerning the regulations governing 
Special Prosecutor Jaworsky’s authority). 
64  History Commons on Watergate, supra note 56; The Washington Post on Watergate, supra note 
56. 
65  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).  
66  1974 Year in Review: Ford Becomes President, UPI.COM, 
http://www.upi.com/Audio/Year_in_Review/Events-of-1974/Ford-Becomes-President/12305808208934-2/ 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
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an independent office of Special Prosecutor. 67   The Act had a sunset 
provision after five years and was extended after its initial termination date 
but with amendments that gave the Attorney General more authority and 
latitude.68  Thus, the Attorney General could remove a Special Prosecutor 
(now called an Independent Counsel) for good cause.  Further renewals and 
amendments were made to the law until it expired on June 30, 1999, when 
Congress refused to extend it.  In 1988, in Morrison v. Olson, the Act 
survived a challenge to its constitutionality.69   
Critical to the discussion herein is the fact that, regardless of the 
tightening and/or loosening of provisions in the law, a constant was that the 
appointment of an Independent Counsel was always ultimately in the hands 
of the Attorney General,70 and that the Attorney General had the authority to 
remove an Independent Counsel for misconduct or other “good cause.”71  
Just as public opinion played a role in Presidential decisions to sign 
extensions of the Act, notwithstanding their objections to its provisions, so 
too public opinion likely affected the determinations of the Attorney General 
as to whether to seek appointment of an “Independent Counsel.”   
To supporters of the Act, an Independent Counsel was required to 
protect against corruption at the highest levels of government.  The 
Watergate matter was seen as the primary example supporting a need for 
such a law.72  To others, the Watergate matter disclosed that the system 
worked.  Namely, while Cox was gone the Special Prosecutor was not.  Leon 
Jaworski carried on Cox’s work and eventually the President resigned and 
several law violating aides were convicted. 73   Others saw the law as a 
                                                      
67 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599.  Whether legislation to create such an office was necessary is subject to 
debate.  Some can draw the conclusion from the Cox/Jaworski Watergate experience that an independent 
office of Special Prosecutor was necessary, while others might look to the experience to show that the 
system worked even in the absence of special legislation.  For the argument that a Special Prosecutor Law 
is necessary, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Learning the Wrong Lessons From History: Why There Must be an 
Independent Counsel Law, 5 WIDENER L. SYMPOSIUM J. 1 (2000).   
68 See Mokhiber, supra note 57. 
69  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).   
70  Id. at 695 (“We note nonetheless that under the Act the Special Division has no power to appoint 
an independent counsel sua sponte; it may only do so upon the specific request of the Attorney General, 
and the courts are specifically prevented from reviewing the Attorney General's decision not to seek 
appointment, § 592(f).”).  
71  Id. at 692 (“because the independent counsel may be terminated for ‘good cause,’ the Executive, 
through the Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is competently performing 
his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the provisions of the Act Although we 
need not decide in this case exactly what is encompassed within the term ‘good cause’ under the Act, the 
legislative history of the removal provision also makes clear that the Attorney General may remove an 
independent counsel for ‘misconduct.’”).  
72  Chemerinsky, supra note 67.   
73  Michael DeHaven Newsome, Independent Counsel? No. Ombudsman? Yes.: A Parable of 
American Ideology and Myth, 5 WIDENER L. SYMPOSIUM J. 141 (2000).   
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fundamental challenge to the power of the Executive Branch and a 
fundamental change in the nature of American democracy.74 
One need not go far to recognize that the Act, placed in the hands of 
opponents of the President in a legislative branch dominated by the 
opposition party, is a powerful tool for making trouble and distraction.  
Justice Scalia in his dissent in Morrison aptly noted: 
Nothing is so politically effective as the ability to charge that 
one's opponent and his associates are not merely wrongheaded, 
naive, ineffective, but, in all probability, "crooks."  And nothing 
so effectively gives an appearance of validity to such charges as 
a Justice Department investigation and, even better, 
prosecution.  The present statute provides ample means for that 
sort of attack, assuring that massive and lengthy investigations 
will occur, not merely when the Justice Department in the 
application of its usual standards believes they are called for, 
but whenever it cannot be said that there are "no reasonable 
grounds to believe" they are called for.  The statute's highly 
visible procedures assure, moreover, that unlike most 
investigations these will be widely known and prominently 
displayed.  Thus, in the 10 years since the institution of the 
independent counsel was established by law, there have been 
nine highly publicized investigations, a source of constant 
political damage to two administrations.75 
Special Prosecutors were appointed during the term of each President 
in office during the law’s efficacy. 76   Its most “productive” use was in 
connection with the Iran Contra controversy.  Independent counsel Lawrence 
Walsh had fourteen people indicted and obtained eleven convictions.  The 
most visible and highest ranking of the officials prosecuted were the 
President’s National Security Advisor (whose conviction was overturned on 
appeal), his subordinate (whose conviction was also overturned on appeal) 
and a State Department official who was convicted of two misdemeanor 
charges (and was later pardoned by the President).  The most senior official 
investigated was a Cabinet Secretary who was pardoned before trial.77  The 
most debated use was the investigation of the so-called Whitewater matter 
                                                      
74  Angela L. Beasley, The Ethics in Government Act: The Creation of a Quasi-Parliamentary System, 
5 WIDENER L. SYMPOSIUM J. 275, 276 (2000).   
75  Morrison, 487 U.S. at 713. 
76  See Mokhiber, supra note 57. 
77WALSH IRAN CONTRA REPORT, SUMMARY OF PROSECUTIONS, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/of
fdocs/walsh/summpros.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2012 at 11:30 PM).   
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that then expanded to the Monica Lewinsky matter during the Clinton 
Administration.  The Special Prosecutor Act was only allowed to 
permanently expire after the Whitewater Special Counsel’s report and the 
abortive attempt to convict President Clinton of impeachment that was based 
on the Report issued by the Special Prosecutor.78  It appears that both the 
public and Congress at that point in time determined that the utility of the 
office was not worth the potential for problems that it could create. 
The abolition of the Office of the Independent Counsel has not 
stopped Congress, or a single House in the hands of the opposition party, 
from pressing its political advantage by demanding appointment of a special 
counsel to investigate actions of a sitting administration79 or even of a prior 
administration. 80   Removing the statutory requirement for appointment 
(when certain conditions have been met) has left the Attorney General with 
the normal prosecutorial discretion as to how to proceed–including the 
power to appoint a special prosecutor within the Department of Justice.81 
While both the majority and dissent in Morrison focused on the 
separation of powers question posed by the Government in Ethics Act, 
Justice Scalia in his dissent quoted from a speech by former Attorney 
General (later Justice of the Supreme Court) Robert H. Jackson.  Jackson 
focused on the rights of the subject of an inquiry by prosecutors, and the 
need for prosecutors to have and properly exercise discretion: 
                                                      
78  See Mokhiber, supra note 57.   
79  Letter from the House Judiciary Committee to the President of the United States (Oct. 4, 2011) 
(public record), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/news/pdfs/Special%20Counsel%20for%20Fast%20a
nd%20Furious.pdf; John Bresnahan, Conyers Wants Probe Into CIA Tapes, POLITICO (Jan. 2, 2008, 
04:44PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/thecrypt/0108/Conyers_wants_special_counsel_on_CIA_tapes.h
tml.    
80  Conyers Calls for Special Counsel on U.S. Attorney Report, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Committee on the Judiciary, Sept. 29, 2008. Leslie Schulman, Conyers calls for special counsel in CIA 
interrogation videos probe, JURIST, Jan. 16, 2008, http://jurist.org/paperchase/2008/01/conyers-calls-for-
special-counsel-in.php; see also, Key senator calls for special counsel for leaks probe, REUTERS, June 17, 
2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/17/us-usa-security-leaks-idUSBRE85G0ET20120617. 
81  Jeremy Polofsky & James Vicini, U.S. Prosecutor Named to Probe CIA Prisoner Abuses, 
REUTERS, Aug. 24, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/24/us-usa-cia-justice-
idUSTRE57N2X020090824; CNN Wire Staff, Justice Narrows CIA Torture Probe to 2 Deaths, CNN 
POLITICS, June 30, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-30/politics/justice.torture.probe_1_prisoners-in-
cia-custody-top-al-qaeda-prisoners-interrogation-techniques?_s=PM:POLITICS (reporting that 
interrogators in 99 cases were exonerated while 2 deaths warranted further investigation); Marc A.  
Thiesson, The CIA’s Exoneration and Holder’s Reckoning, WASH. POST, July 4, 
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-cias-exoneration-and-holders-
reckoning/2011/07/04/gHQASrfnxH_story.html (reporting on special Prosecutor’s report that there were no 
crimes to prosecute); Times Topics: CIA Interrogation Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010,  
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/central_intelligence_agency/cia_interro
gation_tapes/index.html (reporting that the special prosecutor had cleared both CIA officers and lawyers in 
the CIA Tapes destruction matter). 
 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 22 NO. 1 
 
20 
There is a most important reason why the prosecutor should 
have, as nearly as possible, a detached and impartial view of all 
groups in his community.  Law enforcement is not automatic.  It 
isn't blind.  One of the greatest difficulties of the position of 
prosecutor is that he must pick his cases, because no prosecutor 
can even investigate all of the cases in which he receives 
complaints . . . . What every prosecutor is practically required 
to do is to select the cases for prosecution and to select those in 
which the offense is the most flagrant, the public harm the 
greatest, and the proof the most certain. 
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his case, it follows that he 
can choose his defendants.  Therein is the most dangerous 
power of the prosecutor:  that he will pick people that he thinks 
he should get, rather than cases that need to be prosecuted . . . it 
is not a question of discovering the commission of a crime and 
then looking for the man who has committed it, it is a question 
of picking the man and then searching the law books, or putting 
investigators to work, to pin some offense on him.  It is in this 
realm—in which the prosecutor picks some person whom he 
dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group of 
unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the 
greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies.  It is here 
that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime 
becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant or 
governing group, being attached to the wrong political views, or 
being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor 
himself.82  
The quotes from Justice Scalia and Justice Jackson reflect a concern that 
special counsel laws are inherently biased against the person being 
investigated because the Special or Independent Counsel has only one case 
to consider and only one suspect to investigate.  This does not change even if 
the Special Prosecutor staffs the office with professional prosecutors past 
and/or present.83  
These concerns should be borne in mind in the context of Japan when 
considering the unbridled power of an individual citizen to cause a PRC 
                                                      
82  R. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address Delivered at the Second Annual Conference of 
United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940). 
83  Geoffrey Moulton Jr. & Daniel C. Richman, Of Prosecutors and Special Prosecutors: An 
Organizational Perspective, 5 WIDENER L. SYMPOSIUM J. 79, 83-84 (2000). 
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investigation of a particular person—and even more so by the unbridled 
power of a supermajority of individual citizens to compel the prosecution of 
that person.  This is particularly so because a public prosecutor has already 
determined either that there is insufficient evidence that the individual 
charged committed a crime or that for some other public policy reason 
prosecution should not be undertaken. 
IV. RECENT ACTIONS BY JAPAN’S PROSECUTION REVIEW COMMISSION 
Because of their significance, the actions concerning the PRC 
compelled prosecution of Ichiro Ozawa are handled separately in Part IV.  
That said, since the enactment of the 2009 amendments to the PRC law, a 
Commission has compelled prosecution in four other cases.  These cases 
provide sufficient evidence to consider whether the PRC amendments have 
advanced the cause of justice in Japan.    
A. The Akashi Bridge Indictment 
During the summer, numerous city-sponsored fireworks festivals are 
held throughout Japan.84  These celebrations draw huge crowds, and many 
visitors travel both to and from the displays by train.   After the fireworks 
festival held in the seaside town of Akashi, a large crowd gathered at the 
pedestrian overpass bridge leading to the railway station.  In the ensuing 
rush to the train station eleven people died and  hundreds were injured.85  
The City of Akashi disciplined seven city employees for failure to properly 
plan event security. 86   The police investigation referred twelve people, 
including the police official who had been in charge of crowd control at the 
railroad station87 to the public prosecutor office, which charged three Akashi 
City officials, the policeman, and a private security employee with 
professional negligence.88  They were all convicted by the District Court, a 
                                                      
84 Ten Die in Crowd Crush After Fireworks, CNN WORLD, July 21, 2001,  
http://articles.cnn.com/2001-07-21/world/japan.stampede_1_fireworks-display-hyogo-prefecture-
japan?_s=PM:asiapcf.  
85 10 Die in Fireworks Show Crush, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 2001, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jul/22/news/mn-25331; Colin Joyce, THE TELEGRAPH, July 22, 2001, 
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/1334903/Festival-crush-kills-10-in-Japan.html.   
86  7 Civil Servants Punished Over Akashi Fireworks Stampede, THE FREE LIBRARY, July 8, 2002, http
://www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=88685855. 
87  7 Civil Servants Punished Over Akashi Fireworks Display, KYODO NEWS INT’L 
July 5, 2002, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/7+civil+servants+punished+over+Akashi+fireworks+stamped
e.-a088685855.   
88  Five Facing Imprisonment Over Fatal Crush on Akashi Overpass, JAPAN TIMES, July 30, 2004, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20040730a9.html.   
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conviction that was upheld by the High Court.89 The Chief and Deputy Chief 
of the police station responsible for the overpass were not indicted.90  In the 
first case under the amended PRC Act, the local PRC, responding to 
complaints from victims’ families, determined that the police chief should be 
indicted,91 and the Chief was placed on trial by a body of lawyers selected 
by the Kobe District Court.92 
B. The JR Fukuchiyama Line Train Wreck in Amagasaki   
In April of 2005, a JR West-operated Fukuchiyama Line train 
traveling at an excessive speed jumped the track on a curve in Amagasaki, 
crashing into residential buildings abutting the track.  Over 100 people were 
killed in the accident and over five-hundred were injured.93  Families of 
the deceased and some injured parties urged the government to prosecute the 
railway and its senior officials for professional negligence in failing to install 
certain equipment that could have prevented the accident.  JR West 
disciplined several employees.  The executive responsible for train safety 
measures and devices was indicted by the public prosecutors and charged 
with professional negligence.94  Although relatives sought the indictment of 
three other executives, including the President of JR West, the public 
prosecutors declined to indict.  The matter was taken up by the local PRC, 
which indicted the three other executives.95   
The trial of the executive in charge of safety concluded in January of 
2012.96  The District Court held that there was no professional negligence 
because the accident was not foreseeable and there was no reason for the 
executive to have ordered the safety device to be installed prior to the 
                                                      
89  Sentences Stand for Four in Fatal Akashi Crush, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 7, 2007, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20070407a6.html#.   
90 Ex-cop Pleads Not Guilty in Fatal '01 Akashi Crush, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120120a2.html.   
91  The deputy died prior to the PRC determination.  
92 Akashi Policing on Trial, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/ed2012012
4a1.html.   
93Toll in Japan Train Crash Tops 100, MSNBC.COM, Apr. 27, 05. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/762
4164/ns/world_news/t/toll-japan-train-crash-tops/.  Although original estimates of the injured were in the 
450 range, eventually the number was placed at over 500. 
94  Scott North, Japanese Trial Puts a Culture in Shock, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, July 15, 2009, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KG15Dh01.html.    
95 Daisuke Mori & Eri Kurokawa, Uphill Battle for Prosecution in JR West Case, DAILY YOMIURI, 
July 8, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120707002361.html.  
96 EDITORIAL: Former President’s Acquittal Doesn’t Lessen JR’s Responsibility for Disaster, 
ASAHI SHIMBUN, Jan. 12, 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201201120048. 
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accident.97  The prosecutor service declined to appeal, rendering the acquittal 
final.98 
Although the one person against whom the public prosecutors had 
believed there was sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution has been found 
not guilty, the PRC law amendments mandate prosecution once the PRC has 
voted twice to indict and thus the case against the three officials who did not 
have direct safety responsibilities (and hence are a step removed from the 
safety decision that was at the heart of the criminal trial and are at the heart 
of the PRC’s required indictment) must continue.  Experts believe that, in 
light of the acquittal of the former head of safety, it is highly unlikely that 
the three under charges will be convicted.99  
C. The July 2010 Indictment of Alleged Swindler 
In July of 2010, the PRC in Naha, Okinawa twice determined that 
prosecutors should have indicted the head of a securities firm for fraud in 
connection with the sale of securities.  Mandatory prosecution was 
required.100  In March 2012, the defendant was found not guilty.101  This was 
the first case forced to indictment by the PRC that went to trial.  The court 
appointed prosecutors have filed an appeal.   
D. The Chinese Ship Captain’s Indictment 
Both Japan and China have conflicting claims to certain islands under 
Japanese administration called the “Senkaku Islands” in Japan and the 
“Diaoyu Islands” in China.102  In September of 2010, a Chinese fishing 
                                                      
97  Deadly Crash Could Not Have Been Foreseen: Court Clears Former JR Chief in '05 Derailment, 
JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120112a1.html; Ex-exec Cleared in 
Japan Train Crash that Killed 107, YAHOO! NEWS, Jan. 11, 2012, http://ph.news.yahoo.com/ex-exec-
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TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120121a1.html. 
98  JR West Ex-Chief's Crash Acquittal to be Finalized, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120126a7.html.  
99 See, e.g., JR West Cannot Evade Responsibility as Company, DAILY YOMIURI, Jan. 12, 2012, http://
www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T120112004668.htm.    
100 Inquest Panel Indicts Alleged Swindler, JAPAN TIMES, July 19, 2010, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/t
ext/nn20100719a3.html. 
101  FOCUS: Court Ruling Sheds Light on Indictment Proceeding, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Mar. 19, 
2012, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/archive/news/2012/03/19/20120319p2g00m0dm003000c.h
tml; Acquittal in First Mandatory Fraud Trial, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/t
ext/nn20120315a3.html.   
102 Joyman Lee, Senkaku/Diaoyu: Islands of Conflict, HISTORY TODAY 61:5, 2011, 
http://www.historytoday.com/joyman-lee/senkakudiaoyu-islands-conflict; see also China Making Waves 
Again With Senkaku Islands Incursion, DAILY YOMIURI, July 14, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editori
al/T120713003770.htm.   
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trawler in what Japan considers to be its territorial waters around the islands 
rammed  two Coast Guard cutters sent to escort it out of the area.  The ship 
was then taken into Japanese custody as was its captain.  The ship and its 
crew were quickly repatriated to China.  The captain remained in Japanese 
custody.  China protested and an international dispute ensued, with China 
cutting off supplies of rare earth metals that are required by numerous 
Japanese industries, particularly the electronics industry.103  The incident was 
defused, but not resolved, when Japan sent the captain back to China104  
without any criminal indictment.  Japan’s Justice Minister characterized the 
return as not politically motivated.105 
After the return of the captain, a protest was filed with a local PRC on 
Okinawa.  After twice determining that the Chinese ship captain should have 
been indicted, a mandatory indictment was set in motion. 106   China 
immediately reacted by calling the indictment unlawful, calling on Japan to 
take action to better relations between the two countries.107 Considering that 
the captain was in China and unlikely to voluntarily return to Japan to stand 
trial, there was little likelihood that a meaningful criminal proceeding would 
be held. 108   Indeed, because the indictment could not be served on the 
captain within the time required by Japanese law, the court eventually 
dismissed the indictment.109 
V. THE OZAWA PROSECUTION 
Ichiro Ozawa is one of Japan’s best-known and most powerful 
political figures.  He was a prominent member of the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and rose to be the Secretary General of the LDP 
when Toshiki Kaifu was Prime Minister.  He was a protégé of Kakuei 
                                                      
103  Keith Bradsher, Amid Tension, China Blocks Crucial Exports to Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 
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http://news.yahoo.com/japan-indicts-chinese-trawlerman-centre-spat-055211174.html.  
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Tanaka, who would later become Japan’s Prime Minister 110  and Shin 
Kanemaru, an LDP “Kingmaker.”111  Both Tanaka and Kanemaru saw their 
careers end in financial and corruption scandals. 112 Ozawa’s close 
relationship with both Tanaka and Kanemaru also placed him under scrutiny 
by the prosecutor service.113 
It appears that two events at about this time dramatically changed 
Ozawa from what can be considered a loyal LDP political boss to a rebel 
within the LDP and government in general.  One was a heart attack, which 
he suffered at a relatively young age, and the other was the First Gulf War 
and the failure of Japan to actively support the United States by sending 
mine sweepers to the Gulf.114  Ozawa’s view was overruled by older party 
leaders who embraced the view of the powerful Cabinet Legislation Bureau 
that such action violated Article 9 of the Constitution, the Renunciation of 
War clause. 115   This event put Ozawa on a collision course with the 
bureaucracy.   
Ozawa apparently became convinced that politicians should take 
responsibility for setting government policy and that they should be held 
accountable for their policy choices through election campaigns.  The post- 
World War II domination of the LDP coalition of conservative parties and 
the weakness of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) as opposition did not 
compel politicians to be responsible for choices as there was no effective 
opposition that could unseat the LDP.  In part, the system was supported by 
the electoral system, which was a multi-seat district system under which 
voters in large districts cast a single vote but chose several members for the 
Diet.  This system meant that some LDP members had to run against other 
LDP members, thereby splitting the LDP vote while virtually insuring that 
some members of the opposition SDP would achieve election.  While the 
SDP was the official opposition, the reality was that it was dependent on the 
multi-seat system for its continued existence.  In essence, the SDP was 
                                                      
110  See, e.g., JACOB M. SCHLESINGER, SHADOW SHOGUNS: THE RISE AND FALL OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR 
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112  Id. at 106-07. 
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dependent on the LDP.  The multi-seat system worked for the benefit of both 
the dominant LDP and the significantly weaker SDP. 
 Ozawa became a supporter of electoral reform and tried to move the 
LDP to support such reform.116  He broke with the LDP on the issue of 
electoral reform and  sided with the Opposition causing the LDP government 
of Prime Minister Miyazawa to fall. Ozawa left the LDP and started a new 
Party (Japan Renewal Party) taking with him the over thirty LDP members 
who had supported his vote against the Miyazawa government.  After the 
ensuing election,  Ozawa was mainly responsible for organizing a coalition 
of parties that brought to an end the LDP’s almost forty years of 
uninterrupted power and brought in the first non-LDP Prime Minister 
(Morihiro Hosokawa) since 1955.117  As had been the case while he was in 
the LDP, Ozawa remained a “power behind the throne” when Prime Minister 
Hosokowa took the titular lead of the coalition.  Ozawa was not able to hold 
the coalition together and it crumbled after nine months in office.  These 
nine months were, however, a groundbreaking time for Japan.   
In 1993, Prime Minister Hosokawa gave the first ever apology by a 
Japanese Prime Minister for Japan’s treatment of Korea and Koreans during 
the colonial period 118  and recognized the responsibility of Japan for its 
wartime acts.119 Ozawa was the prime mover behind the reforms that saw an 
end to Japan’s multi-seat districts in favor of a system of single-seat districts 
and proportional representation (essentially the current system)120 although 
Ozawa would have preferred a system of single-seat districts with no 
proportional representation seats.121 
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Ozawa is a strong believer in the responsibility of political leaders to 
make policy and thus would downgrade the status and authority of 
bureaucrats.122  Political leaders, in turn, would have to account for policy 
decisions in elections where there were two strong parties vying for votes.123  
The prosecutors recalling his strong support in the Diet of both Tanaka and 
Kanemaru and his former close ties to them have been suspicious of his 
conduct.  Ozawa continues to be one of the most active and successful 
political funds recipients, notwithstanding his recent indictment.124   
In 2003, Ozawa merged his party into the Democratic Party of Japan 
and together with Yukio Hatoyama became one of the leaders of the party 
and one of their principal political strategists.  He is regarded as the 
strategist behind the DPJ’s 2007 victory in the Upper House election that 
paved the way for the 2009 DPJ victory in the Lower House election.  
Ozawa became DPJ Secretary General but relinquished the post as a 
                                                                                                                                                              
diverge too widely, elections are likely to become battles between two large teams.  The demands of 
competition will mean the emergence of two dominant parties that share fundamental goals for Japan’s 
future.  Additionally, a single-seat district system will make transfer of power easier.  …  We can probably 
avoid radical changes and ameliorate some of the weaknesses of single-seat systems by including elements 
of proportional representation.  But a simple single-seat district electoral system will be the most effective 
route if what we are seeking is bold and large-scale political reform.  …  However, I do not necessarily 
support a “combined” proportional representation and single-seat district electoral system.” See OZAWA, 
supra note 114 at 66-68; see also Takayuki Sakamoto, Explaining Electoral Reform: Japan versus Italy 
and New Zealand, 5 PARTY POLITICS 419, 422 (1999), available at http://faculty.smu.edu/sakamoto/PP.pdf.  
Sakamoto refers to the corrupting influences of the multi-seat district system challenged by reformers by 
noting that since party faithful competed against each other in multi-seat elections policy issues were not 
significant in the election campaign, rather constituency services and large campaign spending was seen as 
the primary factor for election, saying “[t]heir need to run successful campaigns against party colleagues 
(as well as candidates of opponent parties) propelled constituency services and the large campaign 
spending to manage their personal vote-mobilization machines because competition based on policy issues 
was an ineffective strategy for those who stood on the same party platforms where party discipline was 
strong” (citation omitted).  Id. 
122  In his blueprint for a “new Japan,” Ozawa writes:  “Cabinet ministers and parliamentary vice-
ministers should reply to Diet interpellation in their specific area of expertise; bureaucrats must not be 
given this role.  In a democracy, it is politicians who have ultimate responsibility for decision making.  It is 
they who must be called to answer, not bureaucrats…”  OZAWA, supra note 114 at 58.  He goes on to add 
that “[s]ome in the bureaucracy may be confused about the relationship between their work and that of 
politicians assigned to their offices.  But politicians would not be invading bureaucratic territory.  
Bureaucrats will remain neutral in the government, providing technocratic assistance to the politicians.  …”  
Id. at 60.   
123  JOE MICHAEL SASANUMA, JAPANESE ELECTORAL POLITICS: REFORM, RESULTS, AND PROSPECTS 
FOR THE FUTURE 16 (2004) (“In becoming a reformer, what Ozawa sought in the new Japanese political 
system was to give leaders both the responsibility and the power to make the necessary political decisions.  
Political accountability required exchanges in power.  Hence, Ozawa became a champion of electoral 
reform that would have voters choose between two candidates with clear policy differences.”) (citations 
omitted).   
124  Ozawa Top Recipient of Political Funds for Second Year in Row, JAPAN TODAY, Apr. 20, 2012, 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/ozawa-top-recipient-of-political-funds-for-second-year-
in-row.   
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consequence of the PRC investigation into his political fund raising 
organization.   
Ozawa challenged Prime Minister Kan in the September 2010 DPJ 
party presidential election and lost.  At the time it was publically known that 
the PRC had once voted that the prosecutors should have indicted Ozawa for 
violations of the political fundraising reporting statutes and that a second 
PRC was considering such charges.  Under the Japanese Constitution 
members of the Cabinet cannot be the subject of legal proceedings 
(including criminal proceedings) without approval by the Prime Minister.125 
As the Prime Minister is a member of the Cabinet, if Ozawa had been 
victorious against Kan, a second PRC vote to indict would have created the 
anomaly that Ozawa would have to decide whether his own prosecution 
should be allowed to proceed.  It is unknown what effect such knowledge 
had on the election between Ozawa and Kan; however, it is not unrealistic to 
think that some DPJ members voting in the election might have wanted to 
avoid such a situation. 
In October of 2010, the PRC, relying in part on a report prepared by 
the Tokyo Public Prosecutors Office that misstated the substance of an 
interview conducted by the prosecutors of a key Ozawa aide,126 determined 
that Ozawa must be prosecuted. 127   Ozawa’s trial opened a window on 
Japanese criminal process when it was disclosed that one of the assumed 
principal witnesses for the prosecution–as an Ozawa aide who had been 
convicted of falsifying the financial disclosure records at issue in Ozawa’s 
case–had secretly recorded his encounter with members of the Tokyo 
District Prosecutors Office’s Special Investigation Unit that had investigated 
the charges against Ozawa.128  The recording disclosed that a significant 
                                                      
125  “The Ministers of State shall not, during their tenure of office, be subject to legal action without 
the consent of the Prime Minister.  However, the right to take that action is not impaired hereby.” 
NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO][CONSTITUTION], art.  75. 
126  Ozawa Case Tainted by False Reports / Top Investigation Squad Members Accused of Influencing 
Committee's Decision, THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN, May 6, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T1205
05002842.htm.   
127  See, e.g., Toko Sekiguchi, Japan’s Ozawa Back in Spotlight as Criminal Trial Begins, WALL  
ST. J., Oct. 6, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020347680457661231178
0829284.html. 
128  The Public Prosecutor Service in Japan is organized both vertically and horizontally.  There are 
District Public Prosecutor Offices in each locality where there is a District Court; there are High Public 
Prosecutor Offices in each location where there is a first level appeal court known as the High Court and 
there is a Supreme Prosecutors office located in Tokyo, the location of the Supreme Court of Japan.  Some 
District Prosecutors Offices have Special Investigation Units whose function is to investigate high profile 
cases, such as the Ozawa case.  Special Investigation Unit members may be sent from one location to 
another to assist in investigations requiring person power beyond the scope of the investigating office.  
Such borrowing was engaged in by the Special Investigation Unit in Tokyo that investigated the Ozawa 
matter.    
JANUARY 2013 PRC, PUBLIC INTEREST, AND RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 
 
29 
incriminating statement attributed to the aide had, in fact, never been 
made.129 
At the trial, the court rejected all of the interview reports and 
depositions taken of that aide as well as several other depositions concluding 
that the deposition testimony had been unfairly obtained through improper 
tactics.130  It appears that senior members of the District Prosecutors Office 
in charge of the investigation may have been aware of the problems that led 
the court to reject the depositions but did nothing about them. 131   The 
inaccurate report was a critical part of the evidence relied on by the PRC 
when it determined to indict Ozawa.132  
 After the court declined to accept the depositions of Ozawa’s aide, the 
press reported that it was unlikely that Ozawa would be convicted,133 and 
Ozawa began to more assertively appear on the political scene.134  Ozawa 
was found not guilty by the District Court on April 26, 2012.135  The court 
was critical of the public prosecutors, finding that the Prosecutors Office had 
submitted falsified reports to the PRC.  Although the indictment was based 
on such inaccurate reports, the court held that the PRC’s decision to indict 
should not be set aside. The court thus reached the merits of the case, finding 
                                                      
129  Prosecutor Botched Ozawa Case Report, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Dec. 17, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111216005956.htm (" ‘When I was compiling the report while 
recalling my memories over several days, I mixed up my recollections of our exchanges while he was 
detained at the office.  They aren't false,’ Tashiro explained.  When the inquest panel in September last year 
concluded for the second time Ozawa merited indictment, it said affidavits signed by Ishikawa admitting 
Ozawa's involvement in the case were credible.  ‘Ishikawa explained why he decided to admit the truth in a 
rational manner based on reasons including, for instance, that he himself is a Diet member elected by 
voters,’ the panel said.  This took into account the content of the investigation report.”)  After Ozawa’s 
acquittal the Prosecutor General disciplined the prosecutor involved, who subsequently resigned (but was 
not charged with any crime).   
130  Masami Ito, Court Nixes Key Depositions Against Ozawa, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120218a1.html.   
131 Top Prosecutors Knew About False Statement in Ozawa Case, but Did Nothing, ASAHI SHIMBUN, 
Mar. 2, 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201203020038.  See also, 
Prosecutors in Ozawa Case Face Punishment Over False Investigation Report, THE MAINICHI, June 2, 
2012,  http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20120604p2a00m0na021000c.html.  
132 Prosecutors Sat on False Ozawa Report, DAILY YOMIURI, Mar. 3, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/
dy/national/T120302005871.htm. 
133  See, e.g., Shin Watanabe & Shohei Matsuyama, Lack of Depositions Hurdle in Ozawa Trial, 
DAILY YOMIURI, Feb. 19, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120218003836.htm.   
134  Expectations Rise for Ozawa Comeback, DAILY YOMIURI, Feb. 19, 2012, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120218003555.htm.   
135  Ozawa Found Not Guilty Over Political Funds Scandal, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 26, 2012, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120426x1.html; Ozawa Found Not Guilty, THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 
Apr. 26, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20120426dy01.htm; Ozawa Found Not Guilty of 
Falsifying Fund Reports, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN, Apr. 26, 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/po
lit ics/AJ201204260028.  The High Court affirmed Ozawa’s acquittal in November of 2012.  See Ozawa 
Relieved at Ruling / Prosecutors Disappointed; Reaction Mixed from Lawmakers, THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 
Nov. 12, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T121112004084.htm.  
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that Ozawa did not have the requisite intent to falsify the financial disclosure 
records and hence was not guilty.136  Ozawa’s membership in the DPJ was 
restored by the Party.  Immediately thereafter, the court-appointed 
prosecutors determined to file an appeal of the acquittal. 137    The 
Consumption tax increase passed the Lower House with seventy DPJ 
members either abstaining or voting against it.  Most were Ozawa 
supporters.  Ozawa and several of his supporters have resigned from the DPJ 
and formed their own party.138 
VI. THE NEED FOR A “GROWN-UP” IN THE ROOM   
A.   Lessons Learned From the American Experience   
American experience demonstrates some of the problems inherent in 
giving either a lay body authority to indict or providing a professional with 
such limited scope that only a single defendant or activity is within his 
sights.  During the civil rights revolution of the 1960s, activists from around 
the U.S. descended on Southern communities to exercise their constitutional 
rights in support of local African-Americans subjected to racial 
discrimination.  Local residents inflamed by such “outside agitation” 
responded, and in some cases did so in a criminal fashion.  This was the 
backdrop to the decision in United States v. Cox.139  A federal Grand Jury 
empanelled to consider whether local residents were denying the outside 
demonstrators and local African-Americans their civil rights determined 
instead to indict the civil rights leaders.  The “grown up” in the Grand Jury 
room was the Department of Justice that took from the local United States 
Attorney the authority to sign indictments and left that authority with the 
Deputy Attorney General who refused to sign the indictment and thus 
frustrated the Grand Jury’s attempt to turn the process on its head.   
 The United States’ experience with the Special Prosecutor law is 
illuminating and highly relevant to the Japanese PRC experiment.  As Justice 
                                                      
136  Court Finds Ozawa Not Guilty / Judges Acknowledge Involvement, Criticize Falsified 
Investigative Report, THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Apr. 27, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T12042
6006495.htm.   
137  Prosecution Appeals Over Ozawa Ruling, DAILY YOMIURI, May 10, 2012, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120509005722.htm; Minoru Matsutani, Masamii Ito & Natsuko 
Fukue, Ozawa Faces Appeal Over His Acquittal: DPJ Kingpin Not Yet in Clear to Flex Clout Anew, JAPAN 
TIMES, May 10, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120510a1.html. 
138John Brinsley & Takashi Hirokawa, Ozawa Forms New Japan Opposition Party in Challenge to 
Noda, BLOOMBERG, July 11, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-11/ozawa-sets-up-new-
japan-opposition-party-in-challenge-to-noda.html; Japan's Ichiro Ozawa Forms Rival Political Party, BBC 
NEWS, July 11, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18794030.  
139  Supra note 21    . 
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Scalia had predicted in his dissent in Morrison,140 the law became a tool for 
political opponents of the Executive branch, regardless of political party 
affiliation, and neither party lamented its demise. The use of the Special 
Prosecutor Law had a significant effect on the Executive Branch, especially 
when the President was in the prosecutor’s sights, as most cogently 
demonstrated by the Whitewater Special Prosecutor investigations and the 
resulting unsuccessful impeachment trial of President Clinton.   
While Japan does not have the terrible and unforgivable slavery and 
Jim Crow history of the United States, it does have local differences with the 
national government.  These differences show themselves most significantly 
in places like Hokkaido, where the Ainu 141  and their descendants are 
discriminated against, and in Okinawa.142  It is not unrealistic to think that a 
“runaway” PRC in Okinawa could and would require indictment for 
purposes other than simply enforcement of the criminal law.  Indictment 
could be seen as a means of protest and as a method of bringing local 
problems to national attention.  It could be used as a weapon in the ongoing 
debate regarding the size of foreign (United States) troops on Okinawa 
defending places like Tokyo and Osaka.143   Since PRCs can themselves 
initiate investigations and then compel indictments this potential for 
mischief exists without any outside or victim complaint. 
The experience of the United States with the Special Prosecutor law 
shows that it is dangerous to the rights of others (and the national interest) to 
give investigation and indictment decisions to an individual or group with a 
narrow focus of investigating a single individual or event.  While PRC can 
investigate a wide range of matters the reality is that when complaints are 
                                                      
140 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).   
141 See UNITED NATIONS, COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, QUESTIONS 
BY THE RAPPORTEUR, Nov. 17, 2009; see also WORLD INDIGENOUS PEOPLES NETWORK AINU, KEY 
POINTS OF THE REPORT OF THE “PANEL OF EXPERTS ON AINU POLICY COUNTERMEASURES”, available at 
http://www.win-Ainu.com/Ainu%20Panel%20Experts%20Special%20Report%20Points.pdf; Masami Ito, 
Ainu Outside Hokkaido also Marginalized: Poll, JAPAN TIMES, June 25, 2011, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110625a9.html; Ogawa et al. v. Governor of Hokkaido, an 
English translation may be found at Saeko Kawashima, Apx. B, The Right to Effective Participation and 
the Ainu People, 11 INT’L J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RIGHTS 21 (2004).   
142 UN COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, UN COMMITTEE ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS, JAPAN (2001), available at, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3df9b15d4.html; UN COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION, QUESTIONS BY THE RAPPORTEUR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONSIDERATION OF THE 
THIRD TO SIXTH PERIODIC REPORTS OF JAPAN, (2009), available at 
http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache:ZCVdkm4vg2sJ:www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/Advance
Versions/CERD-C-JPN-6-
Add1.doc+japan+ainu+discrimination+2010+buraku&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.   
143  It is relevant that in the debate as to how to deal with the Futenma Airbase some proposals to 
move troops from Okinawa to the main Islands of Japan have been rejected by the Japanese government 
because of objection by local residents on the main islands. 
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brought to the PRC they are then involved in a limited investigation and in 
view of the short term of service PRC members are basically involved in 
single issue or defendant matters with no “institutional” memory or history 
or guides.  In this sense they face similar but accentuated problems as the 
Special Prosecutor.   
B. Lessons Learned From PRC Cases 
1.  The Potential for Partisan Abuse of the PRC Law 
As was the case with the American experience with the Special 
Prosecutor Law, so too the PRC law holds the potential for partisan use and 
abuse.  The Ozawa case is a clear example of this potential.  Ozawa had for 
years been in the crosshairs of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.  After all, 
Tanaka and Kanemaru, both of whom were the subjects of criminal 
prosecutions, mentored him.  Yet the public prosecutors concluded that they 
simply could not make out a case and declined to go forward.  Considering 
Ozawa’s rocky relationship with the Japanese bureaucracy, of which the 
Public Prosecutor Office is a part, it would appear that if the public 
prosecutors had a case, they would have pursued it.   
There is no evidence or reason to believe that the complaint to the 
PRC was made for partisan or political reasons or for any reason other than 
good citizenship and all in accordance with the law.  But the Ozawa situation 
shows how a political operative could abuse the PRC system to create 
difficulties for a political opponent. 
The charge against Ozawa had significant political repercussions, 
whether intended or otherwise.   The mere unfolding of the PRC process had 
the effect of forcing Ozawa to resign as Secretary General of the DPJ and 
might have cost him the Prime Minister post.   
Eleven lay persons with no particular experience with the criminal 
process, no experience in dealing with prosecutorial discretion, and not 
having the “big picture” approach that public prosecutors presumably have 
(but rather having only the alleged “victim’s concerns”) before them should 
be compelling indictment and prosecution especially when there are public 
interest or security interests or other national interests at stake.   
 
2.  The Potential for Abuse When the Public Interest Need Not Be 
Considered By an Indicting Body 
Members of the public, when presented with a charge against a single 
individual, especially one who is well known and has been the subject of 
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numerous news reports (some of which may have been uncomplimentary) 
simply do not have the broad reach of knowledge of matters that may be 
outside the formal reports they are given but that may affect prosecutorial 
discretion.  For example, members of the PRC need not take into account the 
public interest in not proceeding against the defendant.  The case of the 
Chinese ship captain would appear to be a prime example of this type of 
problem.   
The captain’s release was only brokered after an extremely sharp 
reaction by China and actions that had a direct and harmful effect on 
Japanese industry as a whole, but especially the electronics industry, on 
whose exports so much of the Japanese economy is dependent.  There 
appears to be no indication that such policy considerations were considered 
by the PRC before handing up its judgment that indictment must proceed.     
Indeed, as Professor Fukurai notes, PRCs may be utilized to 
embarrass the national government.  The Chinese ship captain’s indictment 
created a brief stir that went almost, but not completely, unnoticed by China 
and Chinese citizens.  However, it could have once again ignited the kinds of 
demonstrations and counter measures in and by China that had caused the 
Captain’s release in the first place.  Nor do PRC members have to consider 
the effect of indictment on the accused or the public in general.  Only the 
effect on the complaining party would appear to be relevant to a PRC 
determination.  
 
3.  The Potential for Damage to Innocent Persons Caught in the PRC 
Investigation Process 
 
The PRC “reform” has not been very successful.  Court appointed 
prosecutors have yet to win a case based on a PRC mandated indictment.  
The reputations of PRC charged defendants have been damaged.  The desire 
for vengeance by victims or families of victims may have been somewhat 
met, but innocent persons have been needlessly charged and tried for 
offenses that professional prosecutors believed should not be pursued. 
 
4.  The PRC Process Has Placed Stress on the Rule of Law 
 
Respect for the rule of law may have suffered. The statute of 
limitations for professional negligence in Japan is five years.144  The alleged 
criminal incident occurred in 2001.  The PRC indictment occurred in 2010.  
                                                      
144  KEIJI SOSHOHO [KEISOHO][C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 250. 
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At the time of the incident, the PRC was not permitted to compel 
prosecution, thereby raising questions as to whether, the statute having 
expired prior to the amendment, the PRC law was applicable at all, or, if 
applicable, whether it violated Japan’s ex post facto principles.  The 
prosecution has argued that because a former police officer was both charged 
and convicted, the Chief and such officer were “accomplices,” and hence the 
statute was tolled during the trial of the original case.145   However, the 
Supreme Court of Japan has indicated that “aider and abettor” responsibility 
involves a measure of intent.  Thus, in holding that a creator of a file sharing 
computer program was not an aider and abettor of those who used the 
program to violate the copyright of others the Supreme Court of Japan 
noted:  
 
An "accessory" set forth in Article 62, paragraph (1) of the 
Penal Code refers to a person who, with the intent of 
contributing to another person's commission of a crime, gives 
tangible or intangible aid so as to make it easy for such other 
person to commit a crime . . . a person shall be judged to be an 
accessory when he/she performs an act that will make it easy 
for another person to commit a crime, while perceiving and 
accepting such nature of his/her act, and the principal has 
actually committed a criminal act.146  
It is difficult to conceive of the police chief being an abettor who gave 
“tangible or intangible aid . . . with the intention of contributing” to 
professional negligence.  Negligence, as in professional negligence, 
presupposes lack of intent to cause injury. 147   The court appointed 
                                                      
145  KEIJI SOSHOHO [KEISOHO][C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 254; Ex-Cop Pleads Not Guilty in Fatal '01 Akashi 
Crash, JAPAN TIMES, Jan 20, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120120a2.html.  A dictionary 
definition of the word “accomplice” is a “person who knowingly helps another in a crime or wrongdoing, 
often as a subordinate.”  Definition of “accomplice”, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com 
(search “accomplice”).  In the instant prosecution it is argued that the Chief committed professional 
negligence in that he should have foreseen the danger and acted to prevent it.  There is no argument that he 
did in fact foresee the danger and conspired with his subordinate to do nothing to prevent it.  As being an 
accomplice involves a degree of criminal intent, it is difficult to imagine one negligently acting as an 
accomplice.   
146  Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 19, 2011, 2009 (A) No. 1900, 9:65 SAIKO SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHU [KEISHU], http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2011.12.19-2009.-A-.No..1900.html.   
147 Rodney Mesriani, Differentiating Intentional Torts From Negligence, TARGETLAW.COM, 
http://targetlaw.com/differentiating-intentional-torts-from-negligence (“Tortious acts have two types:  
unintentional, or more commonly known as negligent, and intentional. Negligent torts are actions done by 
the tortfeasor in which he failed to exercise his duty of reasonable care toward other people, resulting to an 
injury-inducing accident. Being negligent is failing to do what a “reasonable person” would do when 
caught in the same situation.”).   
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prosecutors cannot concede that the statute of limitations has run, as this 
would defeat their own indictment.  There is no procedure by which either 
the court appointed prosecutors can acknowledge legal error by the PRC or 
defendant can challenge the indictment, other than through a trial on the 
charges.  This defense of limitations will be ruled on as part of the entire 
decision in the case, which is expected in 2013. 
 
5.  The PRC Process Could Damage Japan’s Foreign Relations148 
 
Prior to the PRC amendment, a PRC in Okinawa concluded that 
prosecutors should have charged an employee of the United States military 
in circumstances where the Japanese prosecutor at the time of its initial 
decision did not have jurisdiction.  At the time, jurisdiction lay with the 
United States under the Status of Forces Agreement.149  Technical issues 
such as jurisdiction apparently were of no concern to the PRC lay 
participants.150   
Nor are such issues likely to deter PRC action under the recent 
reform.  It is only a question of time before a PRC in Okinawa calls for the 
mandatory indictment of a United States service person or an employee of 
the United States military in circumstances where either the United States 
and/or Japan conclude that there is no basis for indictment ,or where Japan 
lacks jurisdiction under the Status of Forces Agreement (“SOFA”).  
Mandatory indictment could create an international incident between Japan 
and its single most important military partner.  While such action might suit 
the purposes of some in Japan, it would not necessarily be in Japan’s 
national interest–nor would it be fair to the service person that might simply 
be a pawn in a domestic Japanese power struggle. 
Considering that all PRC mandatory indictment cases to date either 
have not been, or likely will not be, successful and weighing the 
unsuccessful record against the almost one hundred percent conviction rate 
when public prosecutors charge, there is great reason to doubt that the PRC 
process is working as it should.  Of course, it assists victims and thus may be 
seen as an aid to victim rights regardless of result.  However, both the 
                                                      
148 The discussion of the Chinese ship captain situation discloses an area where foreign relations could 
be damaged. Here, we consider relations with the United States. 
149 Fukurai, supra note 6.  The U.S. forces in Japan are subject to a Status of Forces Agreement that 
allocates jurisdiction between Japan and the United States in criminal cases involving U.S. personnel.  Ian 
Roberts McConnel, A Re-Examination of the United States-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, 29 B. C. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 165 (2006).   
150  Similarly technical concerns such as the statute of limitations may not have been of concern to the 
PRC that voted to indict the Police Chief. 
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general public and those charged have rights.  It is these rights that public 
prosecutors theoretically take into account in utilizing discretion not to 
prosecute.  It is unlikely that PRCs do the same. 
 
VII. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE PRC  
 What then should be done to balance the interests of victims, the 
public, and the targets of PRC review?  It is suggested that the PRC 
mechanism and the 2009 reform need not be scrapped but rather that 
amendment that recognizes the competing interests of the public and target 
should be added to the present law.  This section proposes the following five 
amendments. 
A. The Judicial Secretariat Should Give Members of the PRC Training 
Including Training as to the Use of Prosecutorial Discretion and Why the 
Interests of Society are Protected by the Decision of Prosecutors 
Article 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Japan makes 
prosecutorial discretion a matter of statutory law and provides the following 
criteria for guiding whether to institute prosecution even when there is 
evidence of guilt: character, age, and environment of the defendant, 
seriousness of the crime, and the circumstances surrounding the crime.151 
Japanese prosecutors also have guidelines that direct their use of 
prosecutorial discretion.152 
Prosecutorial discretion is particularly relevant in the Japanese context 
where the decision to prosecute is tantamount to a conviction because of a 
conviction rate in excess of ninety nine percent.  Japanese prosecutors have 
complete discretion to prosecute, unlike the U.S.  prosecutors who, at least 
for federal capital offenses and “infamous crimes,” must get approval to do 
so from a grand jury.153  While both U.S. and Japanese prosecutors possess 
                                                      
151   KEIJI SOSHOHO [KEISOHO][C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 248, available at http://www.japaneselawtranslatio
n.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&ft=2&re=02&dn=1&yo=code+of+criminal+procedure&x=37&y=13&ky=&p
age=1&vm=02.   
152  The Guidelines are translated in to English in Marcia E. Goodman, The Exercise and Control of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan, 5 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 16 (1986); see also West, supra note 34 at 689, 
n. 29.  In addition to the statutory factors, the guidelines include such things as the conduct of the suspect 
since the commission of the crime, and factors that suggest that the suspect can be rehabilitated without 
criminal prosecution, such as the existence of a support system (family, community, employment, etc.) that 
would keep the suspect law-abiding in the future. 
153  JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 63-64 (“The most significant judicial attempt to control prosecutor 
discretion occurred in the late 1970s when High courts ruled in two separate cases that prosecutors had 
abused their discretion to charge.  In both cases, however, the Supreme court reversed the High Courts, 
thereby affording prosecutors almost complete insulation from judicial scrutiny of their charging 
decisions.”).   
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prosecutorial discretion, Japanese prosecutors have a special category of 
discretion known as “suspension of prosecution,” for which there are formal   
rules and guidelines.154  Suspension does not mean that the prosecutor has 
doubts about the evidence in the case–where such doubts exist the 
prosecutor can simply decide not to prosecute–but rather it means that, while 
the prosecutor is convinced of the defendant’s guilt, the prosecution is not 
moving forward because it is considered in the interest of justice not to 
proceed.  This is not simply a ruse to cover up a lack of evidence in cases 
but instead a special category concerning which records have been kept 
since 1909.155  In making this decision the Public Prosecutor Office engages 
in a quasi-judicial function and bases its determination on factors  that 
indicate whether incarceration and/or criminal prosecution should be set 
aside so that the defendant can be rehabilitated.  Suspension of prosecution 
is a significant element of Japan’s criminal justice system.  For example, 
during the period from 1997-2006 prosecutors never prosecuted more than 
ten percent of all cases sent to them by police authorities; suspension of 
prosecution determinations outweighed lack of evidence as the reason for 
failing to prosecute by more than two to one in each of these years.156  
Discretion not to send cases to the prosecutor office from the police 
authorities157 as well as to not prosecute and/or to suspend prosecution of 
cases sent is an important aspect of the criminal justice system as it furthers 
the goal of rehabilitation.158  
                                                      
154  Marcia E. Goodman, The Exercise and Control of Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan, 5 UCLA 
PAC. BASIN L. J. 16 (1986); Daniel H. Foote, Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan: A Response, 5 UCLA PAC. 
BASIN L. J. 96 (1986). 
155  See Shigemitsu Dando, System of Discretionary Prosecution in Japan, 18 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 518 
(1970).   
156  WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 2007, 63, charts 2-2-3-2 and 2-2-3-3. . 
157  Like the prosecutor service, so too the Japanese police (acting under supervision of the prosecutor) 
have an authority to fail to send cases forward.  Known as bizai shobun the authority is based on Article 
246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which directs police to forward cases to the prosecutor “provided 
however, that this shall not apply to cases which have been specially designated by a public prosecutor.” 
KEIJI SOSHOHO [KEISOHO][C. CRIM. Pro.] art. 246, available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/la
w/detail/?printID=&ft=2&re=02&dn=1&yo=code+of+criminal+procedure&x=37&y=13&ky=&page=1&v
m=02.   
158  GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, 415-16 (Wolters Kluwer 
Law & Bus., 3d ed. 2012) (“The prosecutor's decision to suspend prosecution is governed by Article 248 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure and internal procurator policies written down in the Prosecutor's Manual.  
Local prosecutor offices may have their own policies to supplement the Manual.  The determination is not 
subject to judicial review and the Manual is not considered as a rule that must be followed by the 
prosecutor (as might be the case in the United States).  The device of suspension of prosecution is 
considered an important weapon in the fight against crime in Japan.  By giving the defendant a second bite 
at the apple, the prosecutor is attempting to restore the defendant to a state of harmony with and return 
him/her to society.  It is felt that the shame of having gone through the initial process will serve the accused 
in good stead and result in his turning from crime to a restored position in society.  Rehabilitation is the 
goal of suspension of prosecution.”).  
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The training of PRC members should include sample instructions 
prepared by the Supreme Court’s Secretariat that, amongst other things, 
explain the value of prosecutorial discretion and the need for the PRC to 
consider the victim’s claim, the rights of the target of their investigation, and 
the public interest so that members of the PRC can apply similar standards to 
the decision whether to compel prosecution. 
PRCs should be advised that their role is determining whether, in the 
face of evidence of guilt, the prosecutor has fairly and objectively made the 
decision not to prosecute and, if so, that statutorily based determination 
should be upheld.  As things now stand, the PRC reviews the matter de novo 
using the prosecutors’ dossier as a starting point, to determine whether there 
was sufficient evidence so that the prosecutor should have indicted.  This 
status takes the important factor of prosecutorial discretion off the table.   
Prosecutorial discretion can be a subject of abuse—both when 
deciding to prosecute and when determining not to prosecute.  For this 
reason, it is important that prosecution offices exercise the discretion in a 
consistent manner.  “To maintain ‘tolerable consistency’ in discretionary 
prosecutorial decision-making, each prosecutor in the system must have 
some notion of the criteria that he and his fellows are applying.”159  In Japan, 
this is achieved through the use of guidelines and collegial decision 
making.160  When a PRC reviews the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the 
prosecutor office must be prepared to explain how its determination not to 
prosecute a particular case is consistent (or if inconsistent why it is 
inconsistent) with prior practice.  The various objective and subjective 
factors considered by the prosecutor service in making a determination not 
to prosecute must be laid before the PRC so that the prosecutor’s action can 
be measured by the appropriate criteria. 
PRCs should also be informed that exercising prosecutorial discretion 
is not a unique Japanese practice.  Rather it is used by various and sundry 
prosecutor services from a wide range of countries and legal systems.161 
                                                      
159  Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L.  
REV. 1, 7 (1971). 
160  JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 140 (“…it is not so much the individual prosecutor who exercises 
discretion in Japan as it is the prosecutors collectively.  Indeed, from arrest to detention, investigation, 
charge, and trial, almost all major discretionary decisions are made collectively, after thorough consultation 
among at least several prosecutors.”) (emphasis original).  
161  OZAWA, supra note 114 at 14 (“There are a number of well-known instances where prosecutors 
have seemingly adopted policies of nonprosecution, such as Attorney General Robert H. Jackson's refusal 
to enforce the District of Columbia criminal libel provisions, the English police prosecution policy refusing 
to enforce the antigambling laws, Attorney General William P. Rogers' policy barring federal prosecutions 
for conduct previously prosecuted in state courts, and Israeli Attorney General Haim Cohen's directions to 
local prosecutors regarding abortion.”) (footnotes omitted).   
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If PRCs are to make the ultimate decision whether or not to prosecute 
and if such decision is to be made in a structured fashion that is cabined by 
objective factors rather than some ulterior motive be it vengeance or 
political, then PRCs should have both the authority and knowledge that 
prosecutors have as to the utility of prosecutorial discretion.  This includes 
knowledge of the factors that should be considered when deciding not to 
prosecute, even in the face of evidence of guilt.  The current system fails to 
account for appropriate prosecutorial discretion.  This should be changed.  
While it is true that PRCs may obtain legal advice at the first round 
determination of whether to prosecute and must obtain such assistance at the 
second round determination, 162  there is no requirement that the inquest 
assistant lawyer provide advice as to the proper use of prosecutorial 
discretion.  Indeed, this subject is not mentioned in the Japan Federation of 
Bar Associations’ comments on the function of inquest assistants.163  This 
should be changed. 
B.   Prosecutors Should Be Required to Give PRCs Exculpatory Evidence 
So That They Can Determine Not Simply Whether There is Enough Evidence 
to Indict but Rather Whether it is Fair to All Parties, Including the Target of 
the PRC Review  
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, Japanese prosecutors have 
traditionally not been required to give either suspects or the accused 
exculpatory evidence.  This practice is in the process of modification as a 
consequence of the Saiban’in mixed lay/professional panel procedure and a 
series of abuses by Japanese prosecutors.  Thus, in 2005, the Code was 
amended to provide for a form of pre-trial procedure in Saiban’in cases in 
which prosecutors are required to give defense counsel the evidence they 
intended to submit at trial.  In addition, defense counsel is permitted to ask 
for production of other evidence relevant to the case believed to be in the 
possession of the prosecutor.  The court in non-Saiban’in cases may order 
similar pre-trial procedures and disclosures when the court considers it 
necessary.164  While not the equivalent of a Brady v. Maryland165 due process 
requirement for disclosure, the Code allows the defense to request 
                                                      
162  See JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, A New System of Inquest Prosecution Committees 
to Start, available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/meetings/year/2009/090201.html (“When a 
Committee for the Inquest of Prosecution reviews whether a decision by public prosecutors not 
to prosecute a case is appropriate or not, it may voluntarily entrust an attorney as an inquest 
assistant to seek legal advice, and for the second inquest, an inquest assistant is mandatory.”).   
163  Id. 
164  KEIJI SOSHOHO [KEISOHO][C. CRIM. Pro.] art. 316-2—316-32.   
165  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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production of exculpatory evidence the existence of which it may know, but 
the substance of which it is not known.  For example, even where the 
prosecutor has not indicated that it will submit DNA results at trial defense 
counsel may ask for production of DNA collected at the crime scene or DNA 
test results. 166   In response to such request, the court may order the 
prosecutor to disclose such exculpatory evidence.  This procedure has 
resulted in several instances where convicted persons have had their cases 
re-opened as a consequence of the production of evidence revealing their 
innocence. 167   As the PRC is to determine whether the prosecutor was 
correct in not charging, it should have available to it the same evidence the 
prosecutor had when making the decision not to prosecute, not simply the 
evidence the prosecutor might present at trial. 
The Secretariat’s sample instructions to the PRC discussed above 
should include rules dealing with the use of circumstantial evidence.  PRC 
members should not indict merely because they feel the evidence could point 
to the target of their review, but must consider whether the evidence rises to 
the level that would allow a court (if it believed the evidence and found it 
credible) to convict.  The decision not to prosecute likely took this factor 
into account, and, if not, should have.  This is especially so considering the 
almost 100% conviction rate in public prosecutor tried cases and the 
deference shown to the public prosecutors by the court.168 
                                                      
166  See, e.g., KEIJI SOSHOHO [KEISOHO][C. CRIM. Pro.] art. 316-20, available at JAPANESE LAW 
TRANSLATION, 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&ft=2&re=02&dn=1&yo=code+of+criminal+
procedure&x=37&y=13&ky=&page=1&vm=02 (last visited Oct. 19, 2012): 
 With regard to evidence other than that which has been disclosed pursuant to the provisions of 
Article 316-14 and paragraph (1) of Article 316-15 and which is deemed to be connected to the allegation 
prescribed in paragraph (1) of Article 316-17, the public prosecutor shall, upon the request of disclosure by 
the defendant or his/her counsel, promptly disclose it by the means prescribed in item (i) of Article 316-14 
when he/she deems it appropriate considering the extent of the connection, other necessities for disclosure 
in order to prepare for the defense of the accused, and the contents and the extent of possible harmful 
effects of disclosure.  In this case, the public prosecutor may, when he/she deems it necessary, designate the 
time or method of disclosure or set appropriate conditions for the disclosure. 
 (2) When the accused or his/her counsel requests the disclosure prescribed in the preceding 
paragraph, he/she shall clearly indicate: 
  (i) Matters to identify the evidence which he/she is requesting for disclosure; 
  (ii) The connection between the allegation prescribed in paragraph (1) of Article 316-17 
and the evidence which is requested for disclosure and other reasons why the disclosure is necessary to 
prepare for the defense of the accused. 
167 See, e.g., DNA Evidence Again Points to 2nd Man in Mainali Case, DAILY YOMIURI, Mar. 7, 2012, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120306005456.htm.   
168  The Supreme Court of Japan has recently held that a conviction based on indirect evidence (e.g., 
circumstantial evidence) is only permitted when the evidence can only be explained by the defendant’s 
guilt.  See Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 2010, No. 2007 (A) 80, 64:3 SAIKO SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
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Finally Japanese prosecutors and presumably PRCs should have the 
same ethical obligations as U.S. prosecutors to see not only that the guilty 
are convicted (when prosecution is called for) but also that the innocent are 
not improperly charged.169    
C.   All PRC Proceedings Should Be Kept Secret While the Proceedings 
Are Pending  
Two important values are at stake here: the credibility of the PRC 
process and protection of the target of the investigation’s rights.  Once it is 
known that a PRC complaint is being considered there is pressure on the 
PRC, at least from the victim and the victim’s supporters, and in high profile 
cases there may also be pressure from news organizations or others, to 
indict.  Once the public knows that a first PRC has voted for indictment 
there is pressure on the second review panel to reach the same conclusion.  
This pressure increases once it is know that at least eight people have 
already decided that the prosecutor’s determination not to indict was 
erroneous.  Members of the second review panel may feel pressure to indict 
simply because the first panel made that decision.  A decision not to indict 
could be seen by the public as disrespect of the first panel.  The PRC, both at 
its first and second review, should be free of pressure to indict just as it 
should be free of pressure not to indict.  Secrecy concerning the name of the 
target, process, and interim decisions (such as the determination of a first 
panel to indict) is thus required.    
Public reports of a PRC recommendation to prosecute after a first 
round review not only identify the target of the investigation but also gives 
the public impression that the target of the investigation is guilty of a crime.  
Otherwise why would the PRC suggest indictment?  This report has the 
potential to damage the reputation of innocent persons.  Of course, 
indictment itself contains that potential, but that cannot be avoided, as secret 
trial of indicted persons present a far worse situation.  And, if the target is a 
political or otherwise well-known figure, why should that figure have to step 
down from normal activities when they have not been convicted or even 
charged with any crime? The reality is that the public prosecutors have 
already said the target should not be prosecuted.  It would seem the 
presumption of innocence, or at least not guilt, should apply during the PRC 
                                                                                                                                                              
HANREISHU [KEISHU], http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2010.04.27-2007.-A-.No..80.html.  
The PRC should be informed of this standard of proof in determining whether to indict. 
169  Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259 (2000).   
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process (of course the presumption of innocence should also apply during 
trial, at least until a guilty verdict is rendered).170  
Rights of the accused take a back seat under the current PRC 
procedure.  Indeed, at about the same time as it expanded the PRC’s 
authority, the Diet enacted a change in the Criminal Procedure Code that 
allows victims of certain crimes to actively participate in the criminal trial.171   
When the case is before a Saiban’in panel consisting of lay jurors, it is easy 
to understand that the presence of the victim standing before the bar and 
accusing the indicted of the crime could have a powerful emotional effect on 
the lay jurors.  This has the potential to undermine due process rights, 
including the presumption of innocence.172  The timing indicates that, like 
the PRC amendments, the Victim’s Participation Law was designed to 
protect victim rights. However, the rights of the accused also need 
protection.  Providing for secrecy of PRC proceedings and its first review 
conclusions is a small, but nonetheless necessary measure of protection.   
Once an indictment has been issued, the accused should have access 
to the same information the PRC had access to.  This would include 
evidence of guilt, evidence of innocence, as well as evidence that might 
show bias on the part of prosecutors. 
D.  In Cases Where the National or Public Interest Is Implicated 
Indictment Should Not Be Required Until A Further Review Is Held Of How 
                                                      
170  There is reason to question whether the presumption of innocence actually applies in Japan.  The 
extraordinarily high conviction rate (over 99%) in prosecutor generated cases might reasonably lead to the 
conclusion that courts view their role not as determining guilt or innocence but as placing the seal of 
approval on the actions of the prosecutors.  Lower courts can glean this role from the fact that while few 
persons convicted at the lower court have their convictions reversed on appeal the prosecutor service fares 
significantly better on appeal.  See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 2007, 65, 69 (2007) (in 
2006 of thirty-five appeals by prosecutors, courts reversed not guilty verdicts twenty-five times; only 
twenty of 9,343 convicted defendants had their verdicts reversed on appeal in the same year).  Moreover, 
the events in the Ozawa trial (and the trial of his aides) disclose that the courts do not require that the 
prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty—rather the burden of proof shifts 
almost immediately to the defendant to prove innocence and notwithstanding the Constitutional right not to 
incriminate oneself the defendant had best testify and the court must be convinced that the testimony or 
explanation given by the defendant is reliable.  Thus in the Ozawa case although the court found Ozawa not 
guilty because he lacked the statutorily required knowledge of falsity the court noted that it was not 
convinced that Ozawa did not know some of the facts in the matter because it did not find his testimony 
credible—not because the prosecution had shown that he knew those facts.).   
171  In essence the victim is an “intervener” in the case with the general rights of a party in litigation.  
See TOSHIHIRO KAWAIDE, VICTIM'S PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL TRIAL IN JAPAN, available at 
http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~sota/info/Papers/kawaide.pdf.   
172  GOODMAN, supra note 158 at 451 (“The presence of the victim in the courtroom participating in 
the trial alongside the prosecutor and challenging the defendant not as a witness but as an interrogator is 
likely to have a damaging effect on the defendant’s fair trial rights, especially when lay participants are on 
the deciding bench–and may result in more severe sentences than would be the case without lay judge 
participation.”). 
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Indictment Would Affect the National Interest and the Conclusion Reached 
that Indictment Is Proper Under the Circumstances   
It is suggested that the target of the PRC review, the prosecutor’s 
office, the Minister of Justice, Defense or Foreign Affairs should be allowed 
to initiate the process.  A Review Panel of distinguished citizens whose 
determinations would be accepted by the public, such as a three or five-
member board composed of persons such as retired Justices of the Supreme 
Court, a former head of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, a retired 
Prosecutor General, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs now retired from 
politics (and if possible belonging to a political party that is neither the 
ruling party nor a member of the ruling coalition) and/or a retired president 
of one of Japan’s national or private universities, or other similarly 
positioned individuals.  It should hear the views of persons with relevant 
information about how the national interest might be affected and the weight 
to be given to such national interest consideration such as the prosecutor 
service, the target, the victim or counsel for the victim, and most importantly 
the government before reaching a judgment that would then be binding.  
Review by this panel would not be of whether there is sufficient evidence to 
warrant indictment but would be solely limited to whether indictment would 
so seriously adversely affect national security, foreign relations or the public 
interest that indictment should not be pursued.  In this manner, public policy 
considerations could be discussed before a group that has both legal and 
policy experience and can objectively review whether the public interest is 
served through prosecutorial discretion not to indict. 
Such suggestion is not unprecedented, as Japanese law recognizes that 
there are situations where the private interests of parties may need to be 
sacrificed in the national interest.  Japan’s Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) 
deals with requests to produce government documents.  In part, it provides, 
that documents in the government’s possession are subject to production in 
litigation except for a document containing a public secret that if revealed 
would likely harm the public interest or performance of official duties.  In 
such cases, government documents need not be produced. 173   The CCP 
allows the government entity involved to set forth its reasons for 
withholding the document based on the factors contained in Article 220(iv) 
(b).  The reasons are not conclusive.  Rather, the court will review the matter 
                                                      
173  
 MINJI SOSHOHO [MINSOHO](C. CIV. PRO.) 1996, art.. 220(iv)(b), available at  http://www.japanese
lawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&ft=1&re=02&dn=1&co=01&x=40&y=14&ky=civil+code&page
=60&vm=02.   
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and can order production if it finds there are not reasonable grounds for the 
agency’s view such as insufficient risk that production will harm national 
security, relations with a foreign state or states, or international organization, 
or otherwise adversely affect negotiations with a foreign state, or 
international organization.174  Thus, the CCP recognizes that there may be 
situations where the private interests of a litigant may need to be sacrificed 
for the greater public interest.  It also allows for government comment and 
gives the court final authority as to whether production is required. 175  
Japan’s equivalent of the Freedom of Information Act176 contains a similar 
exception although the procedure involved differs. 177   It is difficult to 
understand why a PRC decision to indict should not be subject to similar 
standards, especially as experience to date indicates that the PRC process 
can be used for improper purposes and can adversely affect the public 
interest. 
E.   The PRC Law Should be Amended to Make Clear That While a 
Convicted Party Can Appeal to the High Court, the Court Appointed 
Prosecutors Should Not Have the Right to Appeal From an Acquittal   
Japan follows the civil law double jeopardy rule, under which the 
appeal is considered as a continuation of the initial trial and thus appeal by 
the prosecutor is not considered as placing the defendant in jeopardy a 
second time. 178   Thus, in the normal criminal case, the prosecutor may 
appeal from a not guilty verdict.  This is true even in the case of a judgment 
by a Saiban’in panel, although the Supreme Court of Japan has established a 
high burden of proof for setting aside a Saiban’in panel judgment.179  In fact, 
                                                      
174  Id. at art. 223(4). 
175  Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], July 22, 2005, No. 4 (Gyo-Fu) of 2005, 59:6 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHU [MINSHU], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.22-2005.-Gyo-
Fu-.No..4.html.   
176  Joho kokai ho [Law Concerning Disclosure of Information Held by Administrative Organs], Law 
No. 42 of 1999, art. 5(iii), available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/AAIHAO.pdf.   
177  Although the exemptions from production are similar the procedure involved when production is 
denied and court review is undertaken is not.  In CCP cases the Court may conduct an in camera review of 
the document(s) involved, while in an FOIA type case such in camera review is not permitted.  Saiko 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Jan. 15, 2009, 2008 (Gyo-Fu), 63:1 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU], 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2009.01.15-2008.-Gyo-Fu-.No..5.html; but cf. Saiko 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], July 22, 2005, No. 4 (Gyo-Fu) of 2005, 59:6 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU 
[MINSHU], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.22-2005.-Gyo-Fu-
.No..4.html.  The court’s rationale in the FOIA case is questionable. 
178 Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Sept. 27, 1950, 4 SAIKO SAIBANCHO KEIJI HANREISHU [KEISHU] 1805; 
see also, OPPLER, supra note 32, at 144.   
179  Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Feb. 13, 2012, 2011 (A) No. 757, 66:2 SAIKO SAIBANCHO KEIJI 
HANREISHU [KEISHU], http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2012.02.13-2011.-A-.No..757.html; 
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even a judgment of acquittal by the District Court does not require that the 
defendant be granted bail during the period when the prosecutor is pursuing 
an appeal from a judgment of acquittal.180  
In the case of a PRC-compelled indictment, there is good reason to 
deny the special court appointed prosecutors the right to appeal.  At this 
point, both the public prosecutor service and the District Court will have 
determined that there is insufficient evidence for conviction.  The defendant 
may well be the victim of retribution by the victim and a sympathetic PRC.  
The victim, the complainant and/or the PRC will have had the opportunity to 
have an “independent” prosecutor present the best possible case to the 
District Court.  The victim will have had both a public prosecutor 
examination of the case and a judicial confirmation that the public 
prosecutors were correct in determining not to indict.  That should be 
sufficient.  The accused should not be required to go through yet another 
judicial proceeding.    
District public prosecutors, having lost a case at the District Court 
level, have no authority to appeal on their own but must escalate the case to 
the High Prosecutor Office for determination of whether an appeal is proper.  
In contrast, court appointed prosecutors have no “reviewing body” to 
determine whether appeal is appropriate.  To allow the court appointed 
lawyers to take an appeal means that the lawyers who became convinced of 
the guilt of the defendant while prosecuting the case, now have the right to 
further subject the defendant to an appeal based on their clearly biased 
judgment of guilt.  While prosecutors have the right to appeal either from a 
not guilty verdict or from a sentence considered too lenient, the reality is that 
public prosecutors rarely exercise the appeal right.181  Indeed, while the High 
Prosecutor office has standards and a structure for making the appeal/non-
appeal decision, to allow the court appointed prosecutors carte blanche to 
file an appeal—and potentially to request that the defendant be denied bail 
pending appeal—smacks of abuse of the prosecutorial function.  This is 
especially so in a high profile case such as Ozawa’s where the defendant 
likely holds views not shared by the prosecuting attorneys—those who agree 
with Ozawa have probably previously advised the Bar Association that they 
would not serve as prosecutors.  This creates a potential conflict of interest 
between the prosecuting lawyers’ own views (political, social, 
                                                                                                                                                              
see also, Lay Judges Acquittal Reinstated, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 14, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/n
n20120214a3.html.   
180  Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 5, 2011, 2011 (Shi) No. 376, 65:7 SAIKO SAIBANCHO KEIJI 
HANREISHU [KEISHU], http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2011.10.05-2011.-Shi-.No..376.html.   
181  See JOHNSON, supra note 174 at 41.   
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governmental—all subjects on which Ozawa has written and where his 
views are outside the mainstream of conservative Japanese political thought) 
and a prosecutor’s duty to both convict the guilty and not pursue the 
innocent.  So too, handling a high profile case such as Ozawa’s places the 
prosecuting attorneys in the public eye—a place they may wish to be for any 
number of personal reasons (such as potential future business as defense 
attorneys in high profile cases).  Granting private parties unreviewable 
discretion to continue a prosecution once the District Court has ruled that the 
defendant is not guilty raises “due process” and fairness questions.182   
VII. CONCLUSION 
Like Professor Fukurai, I believe that the Japanese criminal justice 
system needs public participation.  At the post indictment stage, that 
participation should also limit the authority of the state so as to prevent the 
state from convicting a person of a crime unless the common sense of the 
community deems that conviction appropriate.  The quasi-jury Saiban’in 
system moves in this direction and should be expanded to all major crimes.  
A jury, composed entirely of laypersons would be preferred, but at a 
minimum, there should be a mixed panel on which the lay participants 
confer separately from the professional judges to reach a tentative verdict 
before a “grand bench” of the panel meets to render a final verdict.183  In all 
cases, the appellate court should have the right to overturn a verdict of guilty 
                                                      
182 Unlike the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Japan has no “due process” clause.  
However, in a recent civil litigation the Supreme Court of Japan held that the failure of the Court to require 
that a party be given notice of a petition so that it could respond thereto “is clearly contrary to the 
requirement of due process in civil procedure. ” See Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 13, 2011, 2010 (Ku) 
No. 1088, 65:3 SAIKO SAIBANCHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU],  http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgment
s/text/2011.04.13-2010.-Ku-.No..1088.html (indicating that some form of due process may exist in civil 
cases.  So too, a form of due process requirement exists in Japanese Administrative Law.  “However, the 
case law doctrine that fairness in the procedure for rendering administrative dispositions must be firmly 
maintained, as described in 1 above, has been formed through the accumulation of a number of lower court 
rulings as well as the Supreme Court precedents indicated in 1 above over a long period of time, while 
taking into consideration the issues pointed out by Justice NASU.  The legitimacy of an administrative 
disposition cannot be affirmed unless it is endorsed by appropriateness of the procedure for rendering it.  
The issue of efficiency in court proceedings must give way to the mission to ensure the execution of due 
process.”).  See Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 7, 2011, 2009 (Gyo-Hi) No. 91, 65:4 SAIKO SAIBANCHO 
MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] (Tahara, J., concurring), http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2011.
06.07-2009.-Gyo-Hi-.No..91.html.  A similar doctrine may well be applied to PRC prosecutors who 
attempt to appeal an acquittal granted in a PRC required prosecution.   
183  Korea is experimenting with a mixed lay/professional judge panel system where the lay jurors 
meet separately to render their verdict that may then be reversed by the professional judges.  Ryan Y. Park, 
The Globalizing Jury Trial: Lessons and Insights from Korea, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 525 (2010), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/plp/pdf/Globalizing_Jury_Trial.pdf; see also, Jae-Hyup Lee, Getting 
Citizens Involved: Civil Participation in Judicial Decision-Making in Korea, 4 E. ASIAN L. REV. 177 
(2009), available at http://www.pennealr.com/media/articles/vol4/4EALR177_Lee.pdf.   
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when the evidence cannot support such a decision.  However, public 
participation is best used at the pre-indictment stage to limit the authority of 
government to abuse its power through accusing persons of committing 
crimes when the common sense of the public is that such accusation in 
unwarranted or otherwise improper. 
Writing in 1992, Professor West made suggestions for modifications 
of the PRC mechanism to make it a more effective check on prosecutorial 
discretion not to prosecute.184  Japan chose a different route by giving the 
PRC authority to compel prosecution.  
Now that the PRC “reforms” have had time to be tested and have been 
shown to need reform themselves, it is time to consider both the interests of 
targets of PRC review and/or investigation and the public interest.   
The demand for vengeance in the guise of justice, or the use of 
criminal process to embarrass the government, or meet the demands of a 
local community in a dispute with the national government should not 
permit private parties to be the final arbiter of whether a defendant who 
prosecutors have determined should not be subjected to a criminal trial must 
stand trial.  Nor should the rights of the victim complaining to the PRC 
overshadow the national interest or the target’s interests.  Ordinary people, 
whatever their status or position in society or government, should not be 
pawns in personal, political or regional  strategies. There needs to be a 
greater understanding of the role of prosecutorial discretion before citizens 
or residents can be called upon to defend themselves against the power of 
the state to imprison or irrevocably damage reputations.  The suggestions 
contained above would at least provide PRC members with a greater 
understanding of their proper role and the proper role of prosecutorial 
discretion and place a “grown-up” in the room before the national interest 
and the rights of the target of PRC review are sacrificed to victim or 
parochial or local interests.    
 
                                                      
184  West, supra note 34, at at 722-23 (footnotes omitted).   
